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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

LEW ISON,

:

Case No. 991030-CA

Defendant/Appellant,

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for two counts of communication
fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-10-1801
(1999). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Annotated
section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002), which grants this Court jurisdiction over cases not
involving a first degree or capital felony.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS
1. Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the effective assistance of
counsel. Defense counsel failed to (1) admit an administrative law judge's decision that
exonerated Appellant, Lew Ison, of criminal conduct; (2) object to the prosecutor's
failure to obtain an advance ruling before commenting on the failure to call an
unavailable witness; (3) object to the trial judge's erroneous jury instruction that

misstated the law; and, (4) secure Mr. Ison's right to be present during the consideration
of a jury question. Did counsel's deficient representation alter the jury's guilty verdicts?
Counsel is ineffective when counsel acts below an objective standard of
reasonableness and the poor performance prejudices defendant. State v. Templin, 805
P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Criminal defendants may first challenge the effectiveness of
counsel on appeal when the record supports counsel's misconduct and defendants are
represented by new counsel. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^[16, 12 P.3d 92.
2. This Court must reverse the convictions if the jury could not have reasonably
found that, Appellant, Lew Ison, intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misrepresented
the truth. Mr. Ison, a licensed travel agent, requested more money from passengers on an
ocean cruise based on his good faith belief that he had no contractual obligation to honor
the original pricing for the cruise, another person had defrauded the passengers, and that
without the additional funds the cruise line would cancel the entire group booking. Did
the jury reasonably conclude that Mr. Ison misrepresented the need for more money?
In reviewing cases for sufficient evidence, this Court defers to the jury verdict and
will only reverse a conviction when reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543
(Utah 1994). Defense counsel requested the trial court for a dismissal of the charges
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following the presentation of the State's case. R. 391: 441-42.]
3. Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to timely object to an order
imposing restitution for uncharged conduct without an agreement to pay for those acts?
The same standards for Issue #1 apply to this issue.
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Addenda contains the following constitutional and statutory provisions:
Addendum A
Addendum B
Addendum C
Addendum D
Addendum E
Addendum F
Addendum G

TTtah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999)
S. Const. Amend. V
.S. Const. Amend. VI
Utah Const., article I, § 7
Utah Const., article I, § 12
Utah Rule Criminal Proc. 17(m)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 30, 1997, the Attorney General filed an Information charging Mr.
Ison with two counts of communication fraud and two counts of fraudulent use of a
financial transaction card number. R. 1. The financial card charges were unrelated to the
present matter. The trial court conducted a preliminary hearing on July 14, 1998 and
bound over Mr. Ison for trial on the communication fraud charges but found the evidence
lacking for the financial card counts. R. 87.

Volumes 389 through 392 include the trial transcripts. The envelope marked 338
contains the presentence investigation report. Volume 393 contains the sentencing
hearing transcript. The internal page numbers of those volumes are included after "R."
and the volume number.

The trial court conducted a jury trial from September 28, 1999 to October 1, 1999
where a jury convicted Mr. Ison of both counts. R. 389-92. On November 29, 1999, the
trial court sentenced Mr. Ison to two terms of up to five years each but suspended them,
placed Mr. Ison on 36 months of probation, and ordered him to serve 30 days in jail. R.
393: 3-4. The judge also imposed a $10,000 fine, suspended $8,000 of that amount, and
ordered Mr. Ison to pay $3,717.55 in restitution. R. 393: 4. Mr. Ison filed a notice of
appeal on December 3, 1999. R. 277.
Defense counsel filed numerous post-judgment motions, including a motion for a
hearing to challenge the restitution award. R. 313. The trial court never ruled on this
motion. On February 24, 2000, Mr. Ison filed a motion for a stay of the judgement and a
notice of intent to proceed pro se. R. 322-28. On February 22, 2001, this Court
remanded this case to the trial court to determine whether Mr. Ison was indigent. R. 356.
On April 10, 2001, the trial court appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association to
represent Mr. Ison on appeal. R. 362.
On February 20, 2002, this Court stayed the briefing schedule pending the receipt
of the preliminary hearing transcript and the Utah State Bar's ("USB") release of defense
counsel's files. The USB had taken possession of defense counsel's files because
counsel had been disbarred on January 10, 2002, and died the following day. The USB
did not release defense counsel's case files until August of 2002.
On September 18, 2002, Mr. Ison filed a motion under Utah Rule of Appellate
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Procedure 23B. Mr. Ison requested a remand to the trial court for the entry of findin of
fact not a

taring in the record on appeal to support defense counsel's ineffectiveness.

The State opposed the motion. This Court denied the motion on January 30, 2003.
The facts underlying this case began in late 1994 when Aristocrat Travel of
Bountiful, Utah signed a group cruise agreement with Norwegian Cruise Lines ("NCL'')
for a Caribbean cruise scheduled for November 26, 1995. R. 391: 346; Addendum I.
LaMar Lee Fiet owned Aristocrat and negotiated the agreement. R. 391: 373. Mr. Fiet
contracted to sell 66 two-person cabins. R. 390: 191. Mr. Fiet's employee, John
Lofthouse, was primarily responsible for booking the cruise and paying NCL the
scheduled payments. R. 390: 189-90.
To market the cruise aggressively, Mr. Fiet discounted NCL's listed prices which
included a 17% commission for travel agents. R. 390: 194; Addendum I at 1. Travel
agents were free to charge any price per passenger as long as NCL received its listed
price minus the 17% commission. R. 390: 193-94. Mr. Fiet drastically lowered his
commission to underprice his competition. R. 390: 201, 215-16; 391: 374-75, 379. NCL
also offered travel agents a free cabin for every 15 cabins sold. R. 390: 192, 391: 270,
300. Mr. Fiet used these cabins to sail free himself, offer to other agents or individuals
who booked up at least 15 cabins, or sell the free cabins and spread out the savings
among all passengers. R. 390: 199-201; 391: 271, 300; Addendum I at 2.
NCL treated group cruises such as this one as a single contract requiring one total
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funding level. R. 390: 221-22. NCL generally did not record passengers * names for
group bookings nor did it differentiate between deposit money and money paid for the
full cruise fare. Id. Rather, it established a payment schedule which required Aristocrat
to pay $1,600 by December 15, 1994, and an additional $11,200 by July 27, 1995.
Addendum I at 1. Before assigning cabins to passengers, the contract required a $200
deposit for each passenger, or a total of $26,400, by August 28, 1995 (66 x 2 passengers
per cabin x $200 = $26,400). Id at 1; R. 391: 343. The entire amount of the group
cruise was due on September 25, 1995. Addendum I at 1. The group cruise contract
provided that the entire group "will be automatically cancelled unless you contact us by
the option date or if you fail to send the initial and/or second confirming deposit." Id,; R.
390: 217-18. Despite this contractual right, NCL seldom cancelled entire groups and
would normally reduce the number of cabins required to be sold to match the amount of
money the travel agency had paid. R. 390: 203; 391: 273.
Once the travel agency paid for the entire group and supplied NCL with
passengers names, NCL would assign cabins to specific passengers. R. 390: 222; 391:
291-92, 296-97. NCL left record-keeping of passenger payments and names to the travel
agency who would gather money and forward the required payments by the due dates. R.
390: 222; 391: 296-97. Usually, NCL would record passenger names for groups if
passengers paid NCL directly by credit card. R. 391: 342-43.
On January 19, 1995, NCL left a message for Mr. Lofthouse that demanded
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$4,400 within a week or it would release 11 cabins for the group cruise. R. 391: 286;
Ad .cndun

at 1. On March 7, 1995.

JL cancelled reservations for one category of

cabins because it had not received the required deposits. R. 391: 288; Addendum J at 12. Because of payments problems with Aristocrat, NCL instructed its service
representatives to limit its lenienc

Aristocrat's account. R. 391: 289; Addendum I

at 2. On March 31, 1995, NCL redu^d the number of cabins required to be sold to 60
because Aristocrat had no. *jaid the required deposits. R. 391: 291; Addendum J at 3.
On June 30, 1995, although Aristocrat reported to NCL that it had sold 55 cabins, it still
owed $9,000 to assign that number of rooms. R. 391: 292; Addendum J at 3. Because of
Aristocrat's poor payment history, NCL assigned only 33 cabins pending receipt of the
full deposit money. R. 391: 291-92; Addendum J at 3.
NCL reviewed the group cruise account on July 25, 1995, and found that
Aristocrat had paid for 53 cabins but still owed $7,400 for the group. R. 390: 220; 391:
290. On August 4, 1995, NCL informed Mr. Lofthouse that the outstanding debt placed
the group "in jeopardy" and threatened that Aristocrat needed to pay the full amount "to
keep the cabins from canceling." R. 390: 220; Addendum J at 2. Although Mr.
Lofthouse stated that he would send a check that day, NCL's accounting records indicate
that Aristocrat did not send the promised check. Addendum J at 2; Addendum K at 4.
During 1995, Mr. Ison negotiated with Mr. Fiet to buy Aristocrat's assets. R. 392:
477-78. Mr. Ison owned a travel agency named Continental Travel. R. 392: 475. On
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August 21, 1995, Mr. Ison entered into a purchase agreement with Mr. Fiet to buy
furniture, Aristocrat's client lists and telephone numbers, and several group cruise
bookings, including the November 26, 1995, cruise. R. 392: 479-81. The agreement
provided that Mr. Ison acquired only the assets listed in the contract and none of
Aristocrat's "liabilities." Addendum L at 1. Paragraph 15 of the agreement specifically
conditioned the contract on Mr. Fiet's paying all deposit money to NCL: "On
confirmation by Buyer [Mr. Ison] that all cruise and tour deposits have been paid to the
cruise lines, tour operators, or received by Buyer, Buyer assumes all responsibility for the
cruise and tour booking transferred to buyer." Addendum L at 6.
The day after signing the purchase agreement, Mr. Ison entered Aristocrat's
offices and discovered that much of the furniture, client lists, and business records were
missing. R. 391: 448-49. Mr. Fiet had also failed to pay Aristocrat's telephone bill of
over $3,000 which resulted in the loss of phone service. R. 391: 449-51, 378.
The next day, Mr. Lofthouse informed Mr. Ison that Mr. Fiet had not forwarded
adequate deposits to the cruise line for the group cruise. R. 390: 203; 392: 482, 489.
Mr. Ison asked Mr. Lofthouse to complete an accounting of the payments for the cruise.
R. 390: 204-05. The accounting revealed that although Aristocrat had received deposits
for a number of cabins, Mr. Fiet had not forwarded all of the deposit money to NCL. R.
390: 205, 219-20, 223; 392: 487-88; Addendum M. Because the business records were
missing from the office, Mr. Lofthouse could not determine whose money Mr. Fiet had
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forwarded or the amount some passengers had paid Mr. Fiet for the cruise. R. 390: 20812, 222-23; Addendum M. The accounting was also complicated because of NCL's
practice of pooling group money into a single account and only recording passenger
names if they paid NCL directly by credit card. R. 390: 221-22.
Problems with Mr. Fiefs other business dealings with NCL affected the payments
for the November 1995 cruise. On September 14, 1995, NCL transferred $2,919 and
another $2,510 out of the group account to cover debts that Mr. Fiet had incurred on
previous cruises. R. 391: 352-53, 358; Addendum K at 5. On that same day, NCL took
another $4,796 out of the account because Mr. Fiefs bank had insufficient funds for a
check in that amount which he had sent just before signing the purchase agreement with
Mr. Ison. R. 391: 352; 392: 491; Addendum K at 5.
About September 20, 1995, Mr. Ison demanded payment from Mr. Fiet for the
unforwarded deposits, bounced check, and transferred funds. R. 392: 494, 517-18. Mr.
Fiet refused. R. 392: 494. Mr. Ison consulted legal counsel and Mr. Lofthouse about his
obligations for group cruise under the purchase agreement. R. 392: 496, 529-30. They
all agreed that because Mr. Ison had not provided Mr. Fiet "confirmation . . . that all
cruise and tour deposits have been paid to the cruise line[]ff as required under paragraph
15 of the agreement, Mr. Ison had no contractual liability for the group cruise. R. 392:
496, Addendum L at 6. Accordingly, on September 27, 1995, two days after the
expiration of the deadline for paying NCL for lie entire group booking, Mr. Ison sent a
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letter to Mr. Fiet informing him that he refused to assume responsibility for the group
booking. R. 391: 384; 392: 517; Addendum N.
Fearing the loss of Aristocrat's clientele and potential good will with its
customers, Mr. Ison again consulted with Mr. Lofthouse and legal counsel. They agreed
to contact the passengers and offer to "re-contract" with them to complete the group
booking and to avoid cancellation of the entire group. R. 391: 453-55, 392: 496-97, 52932. To make up for the payments shortages, Mr. Ison used Mr. Lofthouse's accounting
to determine how much each passenger had paid based on Aristocrat's existing records
and NCL's credit card transactions. Mr. Ison then used NCL's full listed price, which
included the 17% commission, as the amount each passenger would have to pay to
contract with him to complete the cruise booking. R. 390: 212.
Mr. Lofthouse prepared an offer letter to the passengers based on his accounting.
R. 390: 202-03; 392: 551-52. Because of the lack of payment records, Mr. Lofthouse
spread out the amount in the account evenly among all passengers. If the accounting
showed that passengers had paid Mr. Fiet's original offer in full, the letter asked each
passenger to pay an additional $115 per person. R. 389: 75-76. But, if the accounting
did not indicate whether passengers had paid either Mr. Fiet or NCL, Mr. Ison required
those persons to pay him the full cruise fare if they wanted him to assume responsibility
for booking the cruise. R. 390: 212.
Mr. Ison approved and signed the letter and then mailed it to the passengers on
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October 11, 1995. R. 392: 498; Addendum 0. The letter provided that "all contracts,
quotes, and commitments of Aristocrat Travel are null and void." Id. It explained further
that "some of the monies that were paid to Aristocrat Travel were not forwarded." Id.
Referring to Mr. Fiefs discount pricing, the letter stated "some of the prices quoted to
you by Aristocrat Travel were not accurate." Id. Finally, the letter explained the need for
extra payments because NCL "will not release any cruise documents to Continental
Travel until all funds due [NCL] have been received by [NCL]." Id Mr. Ison prepared a
second letter but it is not clear who, if anyone, received it. R. 390: 235-36; Addendum P.
When many of the passengers demanded that Mr. Ison honor Mr. Fiet's original
price, Mr. Ison agreed not to require more money from them. R. 389: 95; 392: 498-99.
Mr. Ison refused, however, to book the cruise for several couples for whom he lacked
documentation. R. 390: 212. If passengers refused to pay the amount shown on the
accounting, he informed passengers to raise any disputes with Mr. Fiet. R. 392: 569.
On October 24, 1995, Mr. Ison informed NCL that he was "charging [passengers]
more money . . . and advised it['s] to make up for the difference [passengers] paid by
cash." Addendum at J at 7. He also noted that he was requiring five couples to pay
again. Addendum J at 7. Two couples had informed NCL that they would not pay again
and wanted to cancel. Addendum J at 6-7. NCL had a record of them paying deposits of
$200 per person, but because they paid Aristocrat the rest by check, NCL had pooled
their payments with the entire group fund. Addendum J at 6. Mr. Ison informed NCL
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that he was would give up his cabin that he had already paid for and then convert it into a
four-person berth to allow the two couples to sail. R. 391: 301-02; Addendum J at 7-8.
On October 27, 1995, Mr. Ison spoke with NCL's customer service representative,
Allison Perez. R. 391: 303-04; Addendum J at 9. NCL's group sales manger, Ovido
Mendez, had assigned Ms. Perez to handle the booking because of Aristocrat's funding
problems. R. 391: 296, 308. Mr. Ison requested Ms. Perez to change passenger Douglas
Shupe's cabin assignment to a category J cabin and to cancel the cabin Mr. Ison had
purchased for himself. R. 391: 303; Addendum J at 9. Mr. Shupe and his wife had
originally booked a more expensive cabin that included a hot tub. R. 389: 87-88. Mr.
Fiet did not charge the Shupes even his discounted price for the more expensive cabin
but apparently reduced the price as an accommodation for Mr. Shupe's recruitment of
family and friends who had also booked the cruise. R. 389: 84-85, 108-09.
The accounting showed that passengers Terry Millyard and Roberta Woodard
owed over $1,000 because no records established that NCL had received that amount
from them. R. 390: 210; 392: 556-57. Mr. Ison had a carbon copy of a check dated
August 18, 1995, that Mr. Fiet sent to NCL for $1,000. R. 391: 322; 392: 555-56. The
check included a notation that the payment was for Ms. Millyard's and June Field's
cruise. Addendum Q. Ms. Woodard apparently later paid $500 to replace Ms. Field.
NCL records indicated that it had credited the entire group account for $1,000 on August
25, 1995, one week after Mr. Fiet had sent NCL the $1,000 check. R. 391:322;
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Addendum K at 4. But, NCL's records do not indicate that this amount was specifically
credited to Ms. Millyard and Ms. Woodard. R. 392: 555-58; Addendum K at 4. Rather,
NCL simply deposited the check into the group account. Addendum K at 4.
Based on his understanding that NCL had not credited passengers Millyard and
Woodward, Mr. Ison personally contacted Ms. Woodward. R. 391: 456. Mr. Ison
explained the problems with the shortages for the group booking and informed Ms.
Woodard that he could not document that NCL had credited her and Ms. Millyard for the
$1,000 payment. R. 391: 456. To secure her place on the cruise, Mr. Ison informed her
that she and Ms. Woodward each needed to pay NCL $500. R. 391: 456-57. He
suggested that she call NCL herself to verify the problem and then to pay NCL directly
by credit card to ensure that NCL credited her for the payment. R. 391: 456-57.
On October 30, 1995, Ms. Millyard called NCL and inquired about her account.
R. 391: 304; Addendum J at 10. The next day, NCL received a credit card payment of
$1,000 for Ms. Millyard and Ms. Woodard. Addendum K at 9.
After receiving numerous calls from passengers, the Attorney General's Office
and the Department of Commerce investigated complaints about the cruise. R. 171; 390:
225. An investigator for the Attorney General interviewed Mr. Ison twice in November
of 1995, before the group sailed. R. 390: 229-30, 232. The agent believed that Mr. Ison
offered inconsistent answers about obtaining the passengers' consent to complete the
booking and his offer to re-contract with them. R. 390: 233-36. When the investigator
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asked about the request for additional money, Mr. Ison responded, "that difference
between you and me is actually that commissionable income." R. 390: 242-43.
In the meantime, the Utah Commerce Department's Division of Consumer
Protection conducted an investigation. An administrative law judge ("ALJ") held a
hearing on November 20, 1995 and found that prior to August 21, 1995, "Mr. Fiet
became aware that insufficient funds had been paid to" NCL for the group booking and
that those funds had been "diverted" prior to that date. R. 172, 176; Addendum R. The
ALJ found further that Mr. Ison "had not been provided all of Aristocrat's business
records as to readily document those funds which Aristocrat had received from the
passengers in question." IcL Additionally, because Mr. Ison did not confirm to Mr. Fiet
that the deposits had been paid as required under paragraph 15 of the purchase
agreement, Mr. Ison never "assume[d] responsibility for the cruise and tour bookings in
question." R. 173, 176. Moreover, the ALJ affirmatively stated that Mr. Ison "made no
representations to any passenger" and committed no fraud R. 176.
While these proceedings were taking place, Mr. Ison worked with the passengers
and NCL to complete the group booking and cruise. To reduce the deficits, Mr. Ison
claimed that he paid with his own credit card the $6,800 added to the group account on
November 3, 1995. R. 391: 363-64, 459; 392: 501, 586-87; Addendum K at 9. NCL did
not cancel the entire group, and, instead, booked only 41 cabins. R. 391: 313.
The group sailed on November 25, 1995. R. 389: 66. At the time of departure,
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NCL's accounts showed that the group had actually overpaid about $3,000, which
normally would reflect a commissi

R. 391:331,361. Just before the cruise,

:ral

passengers requested refunds but NCL did not process these requests until after the
cruise sailed. Following the cruise, NCL processed the refunds which resulted in a
deficit of $2,229.03. R. 391: 359-61, 371. Mr. Ison received no commission from NCL
and, in fact, lost the $6,800 that he paid himself. R. 391: 371, 459; 392: 586-87.
On October 16, 1996, the Attorney General charged Mr. Fiet with communication
fraud and four counts of unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary. R. 164. In May
of 1997, Mr. Fiet pleaded no contest to one misdemeanor count of attempted unlawful
dealing and two felony counts of unlawful dealing. R. 143. The trial court convicted
Mr. Fiet on July 15, 1997, and sentenced him to 30 days in jail, imposed 36 months of
probation, and ordered him to pay $15,211 restitution to several passengers. R. 140-42.
The State later charged Mr. Ison with two counts of communications fraud. R. 1.
At a jury trial, the State's main theory was that Mr. Ison had recklessly disregarded the
truth in his communications with passengers to obtain higher commissions. R. 392: 61821; 631-35, 655-60. Mr. Mendez, NCL's group sales manager, testified that he had little
personal knowledge or recollection of the group cruise account; rather, the trial judge
allowed him to interpret and recount the entries from NCL's telephone and accounting
logs. R. 391: 275-77. Most of these communications were with Ms. Perez, who Mr.
Mendez had assigned to handle the group cruise. R. 391: 284, 295-96, 308. At the time
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of trial Ms. Perez had left NCL's employ and apparently was not available to testify. R.
392: 580-81. Mr. Mendez testified that to the best of his knowledge NCL never
threatened to cancel the entire group. R. 391: 328-29. Instead, NCL's records indicated
that it had cancelled some cabin assignments to force Aristocrat and Mr. Ison to pay. Id.
Mr. Fiet testified that he and Mr. Ison had numerous disputes over their purchase
agreement, including who was responsible for the unpaid telephone bill. R. 391: 377-78,
394-96. Initially, Mr. Fiet testified that he had forwarded to NCL all deposits for the
group cruise as of the date of the purchase agreement. R. 391: 380. Later, he testified
that he had "no idea" if he failed to pay NCL the required deposit money. R. 391: 412.
Mr. Fiet reluctantly admitted that he had been convicted for defrauding passengers
and had agreed to pay over $ 15,000 in restitution. R. 391: 390-91,411. He believed that
he committed no criminal acts, but he pleaded no contest and agreed to pay aggrieved
passengers following the Consumer Protection hearing and later in his plea agreement
because he wanted to make them whole. R. 391: 390-91,411-13,417-18,430-31. Mr.
Fiet accused Mr. Ison of bumping passengers from the cruise to "make more money." R.
391: 421. Mr. Fiet refused to pay for the shortages because he claimed that Mr. Ison had
"told me so many stories" that he did not trust him. R. 391: 428-29, 439.
Mr. Ison testified that he had no intent to seek higher commissions from
passengers. R. 392: 502, 538-39. Rather, when he learned that Mr. Fiet had not paid all
of the required deposits, he concluded that the purchase agreement was void based on
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paragraph 15 that required confirmation of those payments. R. 392: 529-32, 574. Both
Mr. Lofthouse and a legal advisor agreed with this assessment. R. 392: 529-32. He also
relied on NCL's representations that shortages existed and on Mr. Lofthouse's
accounting supporting this fact. R. 392: 487-91. According to Mr. Ison, Ms. Perez of
NCL had threatened to cancel the entire cruise and refused to release cruise tickets unless
he paid the outstanding balance for the group. R. 392: 546, 580-81. Mr. Ison asserted
that he acted in good faith and that his main goal was to secure the voyage for as many
passengers as possible while fairly distributing the burden of the missing money among
all passengers given the lack of documentation. R. 392: 502, 538-39.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor doubted that Ms. Perez threatened to cancel
the group cruise and asked Mr. Ison, "And, Allison Perez did not come and testify here
today - or in this trial; is that correct?" R. 392: 546. Mr. Ison conceded Ms. Perez's
absence. Id. Later, Mr. Ison testified that Ms. Perez had refused to assume responsibility
for the five couples for whom there were no payments records. R. 392: 580. The
prosecutor instructed Mr. Ison, "I'll ask you not to respond to anything that Alison [sic]
Perez told y o u . . . . I mean, she was not hear to testify. She no longer works for the
company. . . ." R. 392: 580. The trial judge sustained defense counsel's objection to the
prosecutor's comments about Ms. Perez working for NCL. R. 392: 580-81.
In closing statements, the prosecutor contended that Mr. Ison either intentionally
misrepresented the facts in his communications with passengers or that he acted with

17

reckless disregard for the truth to obtain higher commissions for himself. R. 392: 63235. The prosecutor also faulted Mr. Ison for not calling Ms. Perez to testify to support
his claims that NCL had threatened to cancel the entire group booking:
Now, you've got the statement of Mr. Ison that
somebody who didn't come and testify today said, oh yeah
we're going to cancel the entire group. Well, that's Mr. Ison's
statement. And I -1 submit to you that you ought not to look at
the credibility of that statement at this point. Because what we
have are the people from [NCL] who did come and testify, no,
you know, we were just going to cancel certain cabins
We
let them take those cabins and they went on the cruise and the
rest of them we cancelled. They didn't cancel the whole group.
R. 392:621-22.
During jury deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge referring to the
purchase agreement between Mr. Ison and Mr. Fiet. The note read, "Is this a legal and
binding contract during the time of the alledged [sic] offense?" R. 231. Instead of
placing the note on the trial transcript, the trial judge included a photo copy of the note in
the record with the trial judge's response, "Yes" and his signature. R. 231; 392: 666.
The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts of communication fraud. R. 240-41.
In sentencing Mr. Ison, the trial judge awarded $500 in restitution to Mr. Shupe
who received a less expensive cabin than the one he originally booked. R. 338:
Restitution Schedule. The judge also awarded $773.55 to a travel agent named Patricia
Burback who claimed that Mr. Ison failed to pay her commissions for passengers she
booked on the cruise. Id; R. 390: 174. This appeal followed.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defense counsel's deficient representation directly resulted in the jury's guilty
verdicts. Defense counsel failed to present an administrative agency's decision that
confirmed Mr. Ison's good faith beliefs and that he made no misrepresentations to
passengers. Altlv

this evidence was admissible under Utah law, counsel never even

attempted to admit it. Because this evidence established that Mr. Ison acted in good
faith, defense counsel's conduct directly affectea the outcome of this case.
Defense counsel further prejudiced the defense in failing to obtain an advance
ruling before com jnting on the failure to present wi?

ses. Without seeking the

required court per nssion, the prosecutor blamed Mr. Ison for not calling Ms. Perez in
support of the defense theory. Because Ms. Perez was not available, the prosecutor's
comments were improper. Defense counsel's failure to object undermines the validity of
the jury's verdicts because the prosecutor's comments struck at the heart of Mr. Ison's
defense that NCL had threatened to cancel the entire group cruise.
Defense counsel's poor representation further affected the jury's verdicts by not
objecting to the trial judge's erroneous jury instruction that the purchase agreement
between Mr. Ison ana Mr. Fiet was binding. As matter of law, Mr. Ison never assumed
responsibility for the group cruise. But, because defense counsel failed to object, the trial
judge's instruction informed the jury that Mr. Ison had misrepresented that he had no
contractual duty to honor the original prices for the cm
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Defense counsel's failure to object also violated Mr. Ison's state constitutional
right to be present in court when the trial judge considers jury questions. Mr. Ison's
presence was essential to correcting the trial judge's erroneous conclusion that the
purchase agreement was valid. Mr. Ison could have corrected this error and ensured that
the jury was properly instructed that the purchase agreement was not binding. In any
event, defense counsel's inadequate representation constitutes cumulative error.
Further, the State failed to present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable
jury could conclude that Mr. Ison intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misrepresented
the truth. Mr. Ison accurately claimed that his purchase agreement with Mr. Fiet was
void because he never confirmed that Mr. Fiet had forwarded deposits as a condition
precedent under that agreement. The facts support that Mr. Fiet did not send NCL
adequate deposit money and that Mr. Ison reasonably relied on that fact in his
communications. Because Mr. Ison had no contractual obligation to the passengers and
given Mr. Fiet's discount pricing, Mr. Ison truthfully stated that Aristocrat's prices were
not accurate. The State also failed to prove that Mr. Ison even acted recklessly in
warning passengers that NCL had power to cancel the entire group cruise. Finally, Mr.
Ison truthfully advised Ms. Woodward to contact NCL directly and then pay $1,000 by
credit card because neither he nor NCL could document that she had been credited for
paying that amount. Given Mr. Ison's absence of any criminal intent, this Court should
reverse Mr. Ison's convictions for lack of evidence.
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Finally, defense counsel failed to timely object to an unlawful restitution award.
The trial jud * imposed restitution for acts of which Mr. Ison was not convicted and for
which he never agreed to pay restitution. Defense counsel's failure to object resulted in
Mr. Ison paying for conduct that was not at issue in this prosecution.
ARGUMENT
Defense counsel provided deficient representation in failing to: (1) admit public
records proving Mr. Ison's innocence; (2) object to the prosecutor's failure to obtain an
advance ruling on the defense's failure to call witnesses; (3) object to an erroneous
response to a jury question that misstated the law; and, (4) secure Mr. Ison's
constitutional right to presence at trial. These errors individually and cumulatively
directly resulted in the guilty verdicts and deprived Mr. Ison of a fair trial. Moreover, the
State failed to present sufficient evidence that Mr. Ison had any criminal intent. Finally,
defense counsel failed to timely object to an unlawful restitution award.
I.

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
FAILING TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT'S
INNOCENCE, OBJECTING TO ERRORS OF LAW, AND
ESSENTIALLY CONCEDING APPELLANT'S GUILT
TO THE JURY

This court should grant Mr. Ison a new trial because defense counsel provided
ineffective assistance. Defense counsel failed to admit into evidence a decision from an
administrative law judge that concluded that Mr. Ison had not defrauded passengers and
that Mr. Fiet was actually at fault for the shortages. Counsel also failed to object to the
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prosecutor's failure to obtain an advance ruling on comments about Mr. Ison's failure to
present a witness. He further neglected to object to the trial judge's erroneous
supplemental jury instruction that the purchase agreement between Mr. Ison and Mr. Fiet
was binding. Moreover, defense counsel's failure to secure Mr. Ison's right to be present
during the consideration of this question, prevented Mr. Ison from informing the trial
judge that he had legally rescinded the agreement. Because counsel's deficient
performance directly resulted in Mr. Ison's convictions and the cumulative effect of these
errors deprived Mr. Ison of a fair trial, a new trial is needed.
When criminal defendants claim that counsel was ineffective on direct appeal,
they must be represented by new counsel and they "bear[] the burden of assuring the
record is adequate" State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^|16, 12 P.3d 92. Defense counsel
is ineffective when counsel acts below an objective standard of reasonableness and the
deficient performance prejudices the defendant. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186
(Utah 1990). Prejudice requires criminal defendants to show "'that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.'" Id. at 187 (quoting Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). Defense counsel's errors here undermined the defense theory
and allowed the jury to consider improper evidence that directly resulted in conviction.
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A.

Defense Counsel Failed to Present Public
Records Showing that Mr. Ison Made No
Misrepresentations

Defense counsel failed to present known evidence that the Consumer Protection
Division confirmed Mr. Ison's good faith beliefs and that he made no misrepresentations
to passengers. Despite being aware of this exculpatory evidence, defense counsel never
attempted to admit it. The agency decision exonerating Mr. Ison was admissible under
the Rules of Evidence and would have established Mr. Ison's innocence.
Directly undermining the State's theory, the ALJ found that Mr. Fiet had
knowingly failed to forward sufficient funds to NCL. R. 172, 176. The ALJ faulted Mr.
Fiet for not providing Mr. Ison all of Aristocrat's business records. IdL Because Mr. Ison
did not confirm to Mr. Fiet that the deposits had been paid as required under paragraph
15 of the purchase agreement, Mr. Ison never "assume[d] responsibility for the cruise and
tour bookings in question." R. 173, 176. Finally, the ALJ affirmatively stated that Mr.
Ison "made no [misrepresentations to any passenger" and committed no fraud R. 176.
Despite these exculpatory findings, defense counsel never sought to admit them.
Defense counsel was aware of the administrative proceedings because he specifically
asked Mr. Fiet several questions about testifying at the administrative hearing. R. 391:
411-13, 417-18, 430-31. An official copy of the ALJ's findings and conclusions also
appears in the trial court record. R. 170-77.
Had trial counsel sought to admit the ALJ's decision, the trial court likely would
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have admitted it because that decision was relevant to proving the defense. Evidence is
relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would without
the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. The ALJ's decision directly contradicted the State's
theory of an intent to defraud and supported Mr. Ison's innocence.
The ALJ's decision was also admissible under the public records exception to the
hearsay rule. That exception allows for the admission of ,f[r]ecords, reports, statements,
or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth . . . (C) in
civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law,
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness." Utah R. Evid. 803(8). "For documents to be admissible under 803(8),
the preparer must be a public official who made the report within the scope of his or her
duty." State ex rel.W.S., 939 P.2d 196, 200 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
An ALJ's decision following an investigation comprises an agency decision under
Rule 803(8). Zeus Enterprises v. Alphin Aircraft. Inc.. 190 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 1998);
Larsen v. Decker, 995 P.2d 281, 283-85 (Ariz. Ct App. 2000). Such decisions constitute
"factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law.. .." Utah R. Evid. 803(8). Thus, the ALJ's decision was admissible under Rule
803(8). Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson & Co.. 211 F.3d 1008, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000).
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Defense counsel's failure to admit the ALJ's decision constituted deficient
performance because there was "no conceivable strategic reason for defense counsel to
consciously avoid" admitting the decision. State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 941 (Utah
1996). In evaluating defense counsel's effectiveness, this Court ,f'give[s] trial counsel
wide latitude in making tactical decisions and will not question such decisions unless
there is no reasonable basis supporting them.'" State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 293
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted). Because the ALJ's decision served only to
bolster the defense theory that Mr. Ison acted in good faith, there was no possible
strategic reason for defense counsel not to seek its admission. Labrum, 925 P.2d at 941.
Defense counsel's failure to admit the ALJ's decision also undermines confidence
in the jury's verdict. Templin, 805 P.2d at 187. As the prosecutor conceded at trial, the
sole issue for the jury's determination was Mr. Ison's intent in representing why he
needed more money. R. 392: 618-21; 631-35, 655-60. According to the prosecutor, Mr.
Ison intentionally misrepresented the facts or recklessly disregarded the truth in an effort
to gain higher commissions for the group booking. The ALJ's decision undercuts this
theory and supports Mr. Ison's innocence in requesting more funds. Specifically, the
decision supports the defense theory that: (1) Mr. Fiet had not forwarded deposit money
for the cruise; (2) documentation was lacking for passenger payments; (3) Mr. Ison had
rescinded the purchase agreement; (4) he was not contractually bound to complete the
booking; and, (5) sufficient funds were lacking to pay for the cruise.
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These facts fully supported Mr. Ison's testimony that he feared that unless he
raised more money NCL would invoke the group cruise contract and cancel some if not
all of the bookings. "[CJounsel may be deemed ineffective for failure to present
exculpatory evidence of which he is aware." People v. Roberts, 743 N.E.2d 1025, 1028
(111. App. Ct. 2000). Defense counsel's failure to present persuasive exculpatory
evidence on the only issue for the jury to decide, directly undermines confidence in the
jury's verdict. Templin, 805 P.2d at 187.
B.

Defense Counsel Prejudiced the Jury By
Failing to Object to the Prosecutor Not
Obtaining an Advance Ruling on the Defense's
Failure to Call a Witness As Required By Law

Utah law required the prosecutor to obtain an advance ruling before commenting
on the defense's failure to call Ms. Perez to testify. Although the prosecutor failed to
obtain an advance ruling, defense counsel did not object when the prosecutor faulted Mr.
Ison for not calling Ms. Perez. Because Ms. Perez was not available, the prosecutor's
comments were improper. Defense counsel's failure to object undermines the validity of
the jury's verdicts because the prosecutor's comments struck at the heart of the alleged
misrepresentations in this close case.
Defense counsel had solid grounds for objecting to the prosecutor's comments.
Prosecutors may not comment on "matters the jury would not be justified in considering"
such as the failure to call witnesses absent an advanced ruling from the trial court. State
v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 804 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Under the missing witness rule, "'if a
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party has it peculiarly within his power to produce witnesses whose testimony would
elucidate the transaction

e fact that he does r

do it permits an inference that the

testimony, if produced, would have been unfavorable.'" State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052,
1057 (Utah 1985) (quoting United States v. Young. 463 F.2d 934, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
The proponent of the inference has the burden of showing that "'the witness is physically
available only to the opponent, or [] the witness has the type of relationship with the
opposing party that pragmatically renders his testimony unavailable to the opposing
party.'" Id. at 1058 (quoting Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine v. George A.
Fuller. Co.. 719 F.2d 1335, 1353 (7th Cir. 1983)). But, to avoid prejudice, parties seeking
to comment on the failure to call witnesses must obtain '"an advance ruling from the trial
court'" before making such arguments. State v. Thompson, 776 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1989)
(quoting Gass v. United States. 416 F.2d 767, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
The prosecutor below never sought an advance ruling before arguing that Mr. Ison
failed to present Ms. Perez's testimony in support of his defense. In stead, during closing
arguments, the prosecutor blamed Mr. Ison for not calling Ms. Perez to testify:
Now, you've got the statement of Mr. Ison that
somebody who didn't come and testify today said, oh yeah
we're going to cancel the entire group. Well, that's Mr. Ison's
statement. And I -1 submit to you that you ought not to look at
the credibility of that statement at this point. Because what we
have are the people from [NCL] who did come and testify, no,
you know, we were just going to cancel certain cabins
We
let them take those cabins and they went on the cruise and the
rest of them we cancelled. They didn't cancel the whole group.
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R. 392:621-22.
Had defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's failure to obtain an advance
ruling, the trial judge would have barred the prosecutor's comments because Ms. Perez
was not available. The prosecutor conceded at trial that Ms. Perez was unavailable
because she no longer worked for NCL. R. 392: 580. Thus, the prosecutor could not
show that Ms. Perez was '"physically available only to the opponent, or [] the witness has
the type of relationship with the opposing party that pragmatically renders his [or her]
testimony unavailable to the opposing party.'11 Smith, 706 P.2d at 1058 (quoting
Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine, 719 F.2d at 1353).
f!

[N]o reasonable basis" or strategy supported failing to object. Finlavson, 956

P.2d at 293. Objecting posed no risk of further highlighting the comments because the
prosecutor explicitly faulted Mr. Ison for not proving his defense through Ms. Perez's
testimony, thus giving the jury the clear impression that Mr. Ison had a duty to present
Ms. Perez. Given the absence of an advance ruling and Ms. Perez's unavailability,
defense counsel had nothing to lose by objecting and, at the very least, obtaining a
curative instruction from the trial judge. State v. Kohl 2000 UT 35, Tf24, 999 P.2d 7
(discussing mitigating effect of curative instructions). In fact, because the law was
"clear" on missing witness arguments, the trial judge should have excluded the
comments himself. State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19,1fl8, 18 P.3d 1123.
This omission also prejudiced the jury's verdict because NCL's communications
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to Mr. Ison formed the essence of the State's claim that Mr. Ison had no basis for
informing passengers in his October 115 19^5 letter that NCL"will not release any cruise
documents to Continental Travel until all funds due [NCL] have been received by
[NCL]." Addendum O. As explained above, the only evidence supporting the absence
of threats was Mr. Mendez's interpretation of NCL's telephone logs. Id. But, in contrast
to Mr. Mendez's second-hand knowledge, Mr. Ison personally communicated with Ms.
Perez and had personal knowledge of those communications. Consistent with Mr. Ison's
testimony, NCL infor

i Mr. Lofthouse to pay $7,400 "to keep the [cabins] from

cancelling" and to avoid placing the cruise "in jeopardy." Addendum J at 2; R. 390: 220.
Although NCL was flexible with Mr. Ison, NCL's records do not exclude that Ms. Perez
made the threats. In fact, this court should not rely too heavily on NCL's telephone logs
because Mr. Mendez testified that NCL employees often kept poor records. R. 391: 290.
The prosecutor's comments on failing to call Ms. Perez left the jury with the
incorrect impression that Ms. Perez's absence undermined Mr. Ison's representation that
cancellation was a real possibility. In determining the effect prosecutorial comments
have on the jury, this court must look to the entire proceedings to determine if the
comments affected the fairness of the trial. Baker, 963 P.2d at 840. Here, the
prosecutor's comments must be considered together with her implications during her
cross-examination of Mr. Ison that Mr. Ison lied because "Allison Perez did not come
and testify here today - or in this trial...." R. 392: 546. Later, the prosecutor instructed
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Mr. Ison. "I'll ask you not to respond to anything that Alison [sic] Perez told you. . . . I
mean, she was not hear to testify. She no longer works for the company. . . . " R. 392:
580. Although the trial judge sustained defense counsel's objection to this comment, the
objection was limited to whether Ms. Perez still worked for NCL. R. 392: 580-81. The
obvious implication of these questions was that Mr. Ison was lying, otherwise, he would
have presented Ms. Perez's testimony.
Because the prosecutor's comments undermined Mr. Ison's claims that he
truthfully represented that NCL had threatened to cancel the entire group, those
comments prejudiced the jury's assessment of Mr. Ison's statements. Improper
comments on the failure to call witnesses require reversal when the defendant shows that
"'the jurors were probably influenced by the improper remarks in reaching their
verdict.'" Thompson, 776 P.2d at 50 (quoting State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400, 402
(Utah 1986)). In this case, the prosecutor's argument that Mr. Ison was lying and could
not support his defense influenced the jury to conclude that Mr. Ison falsely claimed that
NCL could cancel the cruise. Moreover, given this prejudice and that the law was clear
that the prosecutor's comments were improper, the trial judge plainly erred in not
excluding the comments. State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70, TJ9, 9 P.3d 164. Mr. Ison
requests this Court to remand this matter for a new trial to afford him his right to
effective assistance of counsel.
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C.

Defense Counsel's Failure to Object to a
Legally Erroneous Jurv Instruction About the
Validity of the Purchase Agreement Caused
the Jury to Convict Appellant

Defense counsel further prejudiced the defense in not objecting to the trial judge's
erroneous jury instruction that the purchase agreement between Mr. Ison and Mr. Fiet
was binding. As a matter of law, Mr. Ison had rescinded any obligation to assume
responsibility over the group cruise and he truthfully informed the passengers that he had
no contractual obligation to them. Because defense counsel failed to object, the trial
judge's incorrect instruction informed the jury that Mr. Ison had misrepresented that he
had no contractual dutv to honor the original prices for the cruise.
The trial judge's supplemental jury instruction that the contract between Mr. Ison
and Mr. Fiet was "legal and binding" incorrectly stated the law. R. 231. Whether two
parties have formed a contract presents a question of law for the trial judge. Nunley v.
Westates Casing Services. Inc , 1999 UT 100, TJ17, 989 P.2d 1077. When a contract
contains a condition precedent, the contract does not become binding "until that
condition occurs or exists." Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council Inc.. 1999 UT 34, ^fl4,
976 P.2d 1213. "Failure of a material condition precedent relieves the obligor of any duty
to perform." Id.
Mr. Ison never assumed responsibility for the group cruise because the parties did
not satisfy the condition in Paragraph 15 of the purchase agreement. That paragraph
specifically stated that Mr. Ison was only contractually bound to complete the group
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booking once he gave Mr. Fiet "confirmation . . . that all cruise and tour deposits have
been paid." Addendum L at 6. Mr. Ison could not confirm that Mr. Fiet paid the
deposits. In fact, Mr. Ison specifically informed Mr. Fiet by letter that he had rescinded
the agreement to complete the group booking. Addendum N. Thus, the trial judge erred
in instructing the jury that the contract was binding on Mr. Ison.
Despite the failure of this condition precedent, defense counsel did not object to
the erroneous jury instruction. Trial judges have a duty to correctly instruct the jury on
the law. State v.Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256,1J22, 56 P.3d 969. No tactical reason
supported the failure to object because the efficacy of the purchase agreement was vital
to the truthfulness of Mr. Ison's claim that uall contracts, quotes, and commitments of
Aristocrat Travel are null and void." Addendum F. Because "no conceivable strategic
reason" justified allowing the trial judge to misstate the law, defense counsel's failure to
point out the trial court's error was unreasonable. Labrum, 925 P.2d at 941.
Defense counsel's failure to object also undermines confidence in the jury's
verdict because the trial judge's instruction informed the jury that Mr. Ison
misrepresented the facts when he denied he was bound to Aristrocrat. Instead, the failure
of the condition precedent relieved Mr. Ison of any contractual obligations to the
passengers. Had defense counsel objected to the false instruction, he could have
explained to the trial judge that the contract was not binding and that Mr. Ison truthfully
represented the situation.
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The trial judge's instruction also implicitly informed the jury that Mr. Ison lied
when he claimed that Mr. Fiet ha^ lot forwarded all deposits. Because the validity of the
purchase agreement was contingent upon Mr. Fiet forwarding all deposits, the trial judge
impliedly informed the jury that Mr. Fiet had forwarded the required sums by stating that
the contract was valid. The trial judge's erroneous instruction mistakei v decided the
verdicts for the jury. Because defense counsel's failure to object directly led to the jury's
guilty verdicts, defense counsel was ineffective. Templin, 805 P.2d at 186-87.
D.

b *ense Counsel's Mishandling of the Jury
Instruction Deprived Appellant of His State
Constitutional Right to Be Present at Trial

Mr. Ison had a state constitutional right to be present in court when the trial judge
considered the contents of the jury's question. Nevertheless, defense counsel never
objected to the trial judge's failure to review the jury question in Mr. Ison's presence or
to place the jury's question on the trial transcript. Had defense counsel invoked Mr.
Ison's right to presence, Mr. Ison could have informed defense counsel and the trial
judge that the purchase agreement was not binding.
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution establishes a right for criminal
defendants "to appear and defend in person." This right extends to the trial judge's
consideration of jury questions sent to the judge during deliberations. The Utah Supreme
Court ruled in State v. Lee, 585 P.2d 58, 58 (Utah 1978), that "constitutionally and
statutorily and case-wide defendant has a right to be present at all stages of the trial, - and
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a duty as well: and that any communication between judge and jury should be in the
presence of the accused, his [or her] counsel and the prosecutor." (footnotes omitted).
The trial judge never considered the jury question in Mr. Ison's presence. Rather,
the record simply contains a photo copy of the trial judge's affirmative written response
to the jury's question. R. 231. Lee. plainly prohibits the trial judge from communicating
with the jury in this manner. 585 P.2d at 58.
Although the law since Lee appears to be inconsistent, no case has overruled that
case or eliminated the constitutional right to appear in court during judge and jury
communications. Following Lee, the legislature amended the statute addressing jury
questions sent to judges during deliberations. The former statute had required the trial
judge to bring the jury into the courtroom and address the question "in the presence of, or
after notice to, the prosecuting attorney and the defendant or his counsel." Utah Code
Ann. § 77-32-2 (1976). Two years after Lee was decided, the legislature amended this
provision on jury questions:
After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be
informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall
inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate
such request to the court. The court may then direct that the
jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the
inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be
given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its
discretion respond to the inquiry in writing without having the
jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and the
response thereto shall be entered in the record.
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17(m) (1982). In 1989, the legislature repealed the Rules of
Criminal Procedure and the Utah Supreme Court adopted them as court rules. Utah Code
Ann. Chapter 77-35 (Supp. 1990). The Supreme Court designated the statute quoted
above as Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(m).
Only two Utah cases have addressed the right to be present during jury questions
following Lee and after the legislature and the Utah Supreme Court adopted Rule 17(m).
In State v. Kozik, 688 P.2d 459, 460 (Utah 1984), the jury sent the trial judge a note
asking about the effect of a hung jury on one count would have on the remaining counts
of theft. The trial judge called the jury back to the courtroom, advised both counsel and
the defendant of the content of the note, and then instructed the jury that they were
obligated to reach a verdict on all counts based on the instructions already given. Id.
The defendant complained that Rule 17(m) required the trial judge to reveal to the parties
the contents of a jury note before bringing the jury to the courtroom. IcL The Supreme
Court found no error because the jury's question addressed a point of law for the judge to
decide and, in any event, the judge entered the note onto the trial court record in
accordance with Rule 17(m). IcL at 461. The court reasoned that even if error occurred,
the error was harmless. IcL The Supreme Court failed to even mention Lee.
In State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the trial judge answered a
jury question while counsel and the defendant were outside the court building. The
judge later brought counsel and the defendant into the courtroom and placed his actions
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on the record. IcL The defendant argued that Rule 17(m) required the trial judge to
consult with counsel and the defendant before communicating with the jury. IcL This
Court ruled that Rule 17(m) allows trial judges to communicate with the jury outside the
defendant's presence if judges "enter the question and answer into the record, giving
counsel opportunity to object to the instruction." IcL at 4. Because the trial judge
followed this procedure, this Court found that no error had occurred. Again, this Court
never mentioned Lee.
Several principles derive from this history. First, Lee remains sound law and
establishes a constitutional right to be present when the trial judge communicates with
the jury. Second, both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have never addressed the
constitutionality of Rule 17(m) in light of Lee. Third, Kozik and Lucero both hold that
although trial judges need not reveal the contents of a jury note to counsel or the
defendant beforehand, they must record the note on the record and bring counsel and the
defendant into the courtroom to provide them an "opportunity to object to the
instruction." Lucero, 866 P.2d at 4.
Under any of these scenarios, the trial judge violated Mr. Ison's right to appear in
court. Under Lee, Mr. Ison had a constitutional right to be present when the trial judge
considered the jury's question. Moreover, even assuming that Rule 17(m) satisfies state
constitutional scrutiny, the trial judge failed to bring defense counsel and Mr. Ison into
court to give them an opportunity to place any objections on the record.
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Defense counsel's acquiescence to the trial judge's actions constitutes deficient
performance since it deprived Mr. Ison of his n j i t to be present under Lee . Mr. Ison's
presence was essential to allow him to inform defense counsel or the trial judge that he
was not legally bound to assume responsibility for the group cruise. Mr. Ison has
consistently maintained from his discovery of the shortages throughout this appeal that
he was not contractually bound to complete the group booking. But, without him being
present in court, he had no opportunity to assist his counsel in asserting this contention.
Defense counsel's failure to secure Mr. Ison's right to presence also directly
influenced the jury to convict Mr. Ison. As explained in section IC, the trial judge
erroneously concluded that Mr. Ison was bound under the purchase agreement. This
conclusion informed the jury that Mr. Ison was not truthful when he claimed that he had
no contractual obligation to the passengers. It also communicated to the jury that Mr.
Fiet had paid the deposits to NCL contrary to the actual facts of the case. Because Mr.
Ison could have corrected the trial judge's faulty assumptions, defense counsel's failure
to secure Mr. Ison's presence led to his convictions.
E.

Defense Counsel's Cumulative Errors Require
Reversal

Even if defense counsel's individual misdeeds did not prejudice Mr. Ison, the
cumulative effect of those errors requires a new trial. "The doctrine of cumulative error
allows for a new trial when standing alone, no error is severe enough to warrant a new
trial, but when considered together, the errors denied the defendant a fair trial." State v.
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Young. 853 P.2d 327, 368 (Utah 1993). Here, defense counsel failed to present
exculpatory evidence and object to the admission of damaging evidence. As explained in
section II below, this case was close and turned on Mr. Ison's good faith beliefs,
interpreting inconclusive evidence, and the prosecutor's claim that Mr. Ison sought
higher commissions. Had defense counsel adequately represented Mr. Ison, the jury
likely would have had the grounds it needed to acquit Mr. Ison.
II.

THE STATE PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
BECAUSE APPELLANT ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND
ACCURATELY REPRESENTED THE FACTS

The evidence presented at trial failed to prove any criminal intent. Rather, Mr.
Ison's representations in the October 11, 1995 and to Ms. Millyard were truthful and
made in good faith. Because a reasonable jury could not have convicted Mr. Ison, this
Court should reverse Mr. Ison's convictions for lack of evidence.
In reviewing cases for sufficient evidence, this Court affords great deference to
the jury verdict. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). It will only reverse a
conviction when reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime. Id When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting a jury verdict, the appellant "must marshal the evidence in support of the
verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins. 1999 UT 98, ^14, 989 P.2d 1065.
Because Mr. Ison admitted making the statements in the letter and to Ms.
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Woodward, the only real question for the jury was Mr. Ison's knowledge and intent at the
time he made those statements. Communications fraud occurs when "the pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted
intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth." Utah Code Ann. § 7610-1801(7) (1999). The marshaled evidence showed that despite Mr. Ison's claim in his
letter that "all contracts, quotes, and commitments of Aristocrat Travel are null and
^oid," the purchase agreement between Mr. Ison and Mr. Fiet was designed to transfer
the group cruise to Mr. Ison. Addendum O. Further, contrary to Mr. Ison's claims that
he was not bound to complete the booking, he attempted to do so.
The marshaled evidence provided further that the contract with NCL required
Aristocrat to pay only $12,800 by July 27, 1995. Addendum I at 1. NCL's accounting
records revealed that the group cruise account had over $15,000 as of that date.
Addendum K at 1-3. Based on this amount, the prosecutor argued that the purchase
agreement was valid and that Mr. Fiet had "forwarded" all deposits to NCL. R. 392:
614-15. At the very least, the State claimed that Mr. Ison recklessly disregarded the
truth when he claimed that Mr. Fiet had not forwarded deposits. According to the
prosecutor, NCL's transferring of several thousand dollars out of the group cruise
account to pay for Mr. Fiet's other debts and the bounced check for $4796 technically
were not failures to "forward" money. R. 392: 616-19. Instead, the prosecutor asserted
that Mr. Ison recklessly relied on Mr. Lofthouse's and NCL's claims that Mr. Fiet had
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not forwarded the deposits without determining the true nature of the shortages. R. 392:
616-21.
The marshaled evidence included further Mr. Ison's statement to the investigator
that "between you and me" the difference between his prices and Mr. Fiet's pricing was
"commissionable income/' R. 390: 242-43. The State claimed that this statement
showed that Mr. Ison's actual motive in requesting more money was to increase his
commissions. R. 392: 620-21. Based on this assumption, the State accused Mr. Ison of
misrepresenting that Mr. Fiet's discount pricing was "not accurate." Addendum O.
The prosecutor contended further that Mr. Ison's statement that NCL "will not
release any cruise documents to Continental Travel until all funds due have been
received by [NCL]" because NCL had repeatedly reduced the number of assigned cabins
and the amount of money due without ever cancelling the cruise. R. 392: 623-24, 657.
In support, Mr. Mendez testified that his interpretation of the telephone logs indicated
that NCL had not threatened to cancel the entire group. Rather, he surmised that NCL
was extremely flexible in handling the group cruise account. R. 391: 328-29.
The other evidence presented at trial refutes the State's interpretation of the facts.
Mr. Ison correctly understood that Mr. Fiet failed to forward deposits. From January to
June of 1995, NCL repeatedly notified Aristocrat that it needed thousands more dollars
in deposit money to book the 66 cabins. Addendum J at 1-3. On several occasions, NCL
demanded money and adjusted downward the number of assigned cabins because of lack
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of deposit money. R. 391: 288. NCL was so concerned about Aristocrat's poor payment
history that Mr. Mendez ordered NCL employees to limit flexibility with Aristocrat and
he assigned Ms. Perez to solely handle the account. R. 391: 288-89, 296, 308. Then, in
June of 1995, NCL would only assign 33 cabins to the group because Aristocrat still
owed $9,000 in deposit money. R. 391: 291-92.
When Mr. Ison took over Aristocrat in August 1995, Mr. Lofthouse immediately
informed him that Mr. Fiet had not forwarded adequate deposits. R. 390: 203; 392: 482,
489. Mr. Lofthouse had sound reasons for this conclusion because he personally handled
the cruise booking and payments and NCL had informed him earlier that month that
Aristocrat owed $7,400 "to keep the cabins from canceling." R. 390: 189-91; 391: 290;
Addendum J at 2. Mr. Lofthouse also never sent NCL the promised check for that
amount. When Mr. Ison arrived at Aristocrat's offices on August 22, 1995, Mr.
Lofthouse had a firm basis for warning Mr. Ison of the shortages.
Mr. Ison had firm grounds for believing Mr. Lofthouse. Mr. Ison conscientiously
instructed Mr. Lofthouse to conduct a complete accounting of the group cruise based on
Mr. Lofthouse's responsibility for it. The accounting revealed that Mr. Fiet had not
forwarded adequate funds for the cruise nor had he documented passenger payments. R.
390: 205, 219-20; 392: 487-88. There was, thus, no way of determining who had paid
for the cruise. R. 390: 203; 392: 482, 489. Mr. Ison accurately concluded from this
investigation that Mr. Fiet had not pair the required deposits. In no sense, did Mr. Ison
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intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misrepresent the absence of adequate funds.
Even accepting the prosecutor's technical distinction between deposit money and
the money NCL transferred out of the account, this is a distinction without meaning.
Assuming that adequate deposit money existed when Mr. Ison took over Aristocrat in
August of 1995, it is undisputed that funds were lacking when Mr. Ison communicated
with passengers in October of that year. The cause of the lost funds was immaterial. The
end result was that Mr. Fiet was responsible for the missing money and that without
additional funds Mr. Ison could not book the cruise. Also, time was of the essence
because the September deadline for full payment had passed. In sum, Mr. Ison's
representations that Mr. Fiet had not forwarded adequate money were accurate.
Mr. Ison also had firm grounds for informing passengers that the group contract
was "null and void." Addendum O. After conducting the accounting and learning of the
shortages in the group cruise account, Mr. Ison could not confirm that Mr. Fiet had paid
the required deposits. After consulting with Mr. Lofthouse and a legal advisor, Mr. Ison
verified with them that he was not bound to honor the group cruise contract. R . 392:
496, 529-30. Finally, Mr. Ison informed Mr. Fiet in a letter dated September 27, 1995
that he would not assume responsibility for the group cruise because he could not
confirm that Mr. Fiet had paid the deposit money. Addendum N. Because of the
absence of confirmation, Mr. Ison truthfully represented that he was not contractually
bound to complete the group booking. Harper, 1999 UT 34, ^14, 976 P.3d 1213.
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Contrary to the State's perceived motive to obtain higher commissions, Mr. Ison
rep*

:mted that the prices were inaccurate based on his correct k J conclusion that he

was not bound to honor Mr. Fiefs prices. Because shortages existed for the cruise, Mr.
Ison needed to generate revenue to ensure that the group sailed and that he would not
iOse Aristocrat's clientele. Mr. Ison, therefore, offered to enter into a new agreement
with passengers. Stating that Mr. Fiefs pricing was not accu^ e correctly described that
Mr. Fiet had not charged the full price for the cruise. Tt also

arately communicated

that more money was needed because Mr. Fiet had not adequately priced the cruise to
cover any shortages. At the very least, in describing Mr. Fiefs pricing as inaccurate, Mr.
Ison had no intent to intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly deceive passengers.
Mr. Ison also had valid reasons for informing passengers of the threat of
cancellation. The group cruise contract unequivocally provided that entire groups "will
be automatically cancelled unless you contact us by the option date or if you fail to send
the initial and/or second confirming deposit." Addendum I at 1. The State presented no
evidence showing that Mr. Ison had knowledge or experience that would have led him to
disbelief this explicit contractual right. Consistent with this statement, NCL informed
Mr. Lofthouse on August 4, 1995 that it needed $7,400 immediately "to keep the cabins
from canceling." Addendum J at 2. Further, Mr. Ison testified that Ms. Perez had
threatened to cancel the entire cruise if c :rtain funding levels were not met. R. 392: 546,
580-81. Even if Mr. Ison knew that NCL rarely cancelled entire groups, a reasonable
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business person would have planned for this contingency.
Further, Mr. Mendez's interpretation of the NCL's records was of limited
probative value. As even he conceded, he had little personal knowledge or memory of
NCL's dealings with the group cruise. R. 391: 275-77. Rather, Ms. Perez handled most
of the communications with Mr. Ison. The only evidence the State presented of the lack
of threats was Mr. Mendez's own interpretation of NCL's telephone logs. But, Mr.
Mendez admitted that NCL's employees often had poor record-keeping habits. R. 391:
290. In contrast, the explicit terms of the group cruise contract and Mr. Ison's
unequivocal testimony of Ms. Perez's threats undermined Mr. Mendez's second-hand
testimony. This paucity of evidence creates a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ison
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misrepresent the possibility of cancellation.
Concerning the communications fraud charge involving Ms. Woodward, the
marshaled evidence showed that both Mr. Ison and NCL possessed copies of a check for
$1,000 that included Ms. Millyard's and June Field's names. Addendum Q; R. 391: 322;
392: 555-56. The prosecutor contended that Mr. Ison either intentionally ignored the
names on the check or that he had recklessly failed to notice the names. R. 392: 611-12.
In contrast to these claims, neither Aristocrat nor NCL had a record crediting Ms.
Millyard or Ms. Field with paying $500 each. R. 392: 557. In fact, NCL's records
establish that the $1,000 check was pooled with all other cash deposits into the group
cruise account without specifying who had sent the money. Addendum K at 4. Further,
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Mr. Lofthouse informed Mr. Ison that he could not verify from his accounting whether
Ms. Millyard and Ms. Field had pah .he $1,000. R. 390: 203; 392: 482, 489.
In the absence of documentation from Aristocrat and NCL, Mr. Ison approached
Ms. Woodward who had replaced Ms. Field, explained his honest understanding of the
situation, and sugge ;*:d that she contact NCL directly to confirm the missing
documentation. R. 391: 456. Mr. Ison suggested that Ms. Woodward pay NCI lirectly
by credit card to ensure that she was credited for the criise and was assigned a cabin. R.
391: 456-57. Ms. Millyard called NCL on October 30, 1995 and paid $1,000 by credit
card the next day. Addendum J at 10; Addendum K at 9.
At the very least, the evidence showed that Mr. Ison honestly believed that he
could not document that Ms. Millyard and Ms. Field had paid the $1,000. This belief
was not reckless because Mr. Ison relied on an accounting from Mr. Lofthouse who
handled the group cruise and the payments for it, he contacted NCL and verified the
$1,000 had not been credited to anyone specifically, and he asked Ms. Woodward to
confirm his findings with NCL before she paid more money. His suggestion that Ms.
Woodward pay NCL directly by credit card further supports Mr. Ison's lack of intent to
defraud. If he were seeking more money for himself, he would have asked Ms.
Woodward to pay him in cash.
As further support of Mr. Ison's innocence, it is undisputed that Mr. Ison received
no commissions for his efforts. In fact, Mr. Ison gave up his own cabin and personally

45

paid $6,800 to secure the voyage. R. 391: 371, 459; 392: 586-87. NCL's records
confirm that Mr. Ison's intent in requesting more money was to "make up the difference
[passengers paid] by cash. . . ." Addendum J at 7. As a testimony to Mr. Ison's good
faith, despite all of his efforts he suffered a huge loss. Moreover, the ALJ's decision
would have bolstered Mr. Ison's lack of intent had defense counsel admitted it.
Because Mr. Ison communicated with passengers based on his good faith efforts
to ascertain the truth and given that his statements were accurate, the State failed to
establish any criminal intent. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543. At most, this case involved a
civil matter to be sorted out among the passengers, Mr. Ison, Mr. Fiet, and NCL, rather
than in a felony court. Accordingly, Mr. Ison seeks reversal of his convictions.
III.

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE
FOR FAILING TO TIMELY OBJECT TO
AN UNLAWFUL RESTITUTION AWARD

Trial courts may impose restitution for crimes of which the defendant is convicted,
for conduct as part of a plea agreement, or when the defendant admits responsibility for
other crimes. The trial judge below ordered Mr. Ison to pay restitution for conduct not
related to the convictions and in the absence of any agreement or admission of
responsibility. Defense counsel filed an untimely post-sentencing motion to correct the
unlawful restitution award, thereby waiving any challenge to restitution. Defense
counsel's deficient representation resulted in Mr. Ison paying for alleged crimes of which
he was not convicted and for which he never agreed to pay.
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Utah law does not allow for restitution to be awarded for alleged activities
unconnected to the conduct for which Mr. Ison was convicted. Utah Code Annotated
section 76-3-201 authorizes trial courts to pay restitution for crimes of which the
defendant (1) is "convicted;" (2) "for which the defendant admits responsibility to the
sentencing court;" or, (3) "for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make
restitution as part of a plea agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1 )(b), (4)(a)(i)
(1999); see also State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 937 (Utah 1998) (limiting restitution to
these three situations).
The trial judge awarded $500 in restitution to Mr. Shupe for his receiving a less
expensive cabin than the one he paid for. The judge also awarded $773.55 to Patricia
Burback for commissions that allegedly Mr. Fiet and Mr. Ison promised her. Mr. Ison
did not agree to pay restitution as part of a plea agreement and he at no time admitted
responsibility for defrauding any passengers. Further, the trial judge never "' firmly
established'" that Mr. Ison admitted responsibility for other conduct. State v. Bickley,
2002 UT App 342, TflO, 60 P.3d 582 (quoting State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, ^[5,
987 P.2d 1289)). Thus, the trial court only had authority to impose restitution for the
crimes of which Mr. Ison was convicted. Galli, 967 P.2d at 937.
The jury did not convict Mr. Ison for giving Mr. Shupe a less expensive cabin or
for not paying Ms. Burback commissions. Rather the charges alleged that he "devised a
scheme or artifice to defraud" passengers based on the October 11, 1995 letter and for his
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conversation with Ms. Woodward. R. 2-3. Because Mr. Shupe's and Ms. Burback's
losses had no connection with the communications with Ms. Woodward, Mr. Shupe and
Ms. Burback were only entitled to restitution if they were victims of the October 11,
1995 letter. Galli. 967 P.2d at 937.
The alleged misrepresentations in that letter were totally unrelated to Mr. Shupe's
and Ms. Burback's claims. Nothing in the letter addresses Mr. Shupe's cabin
assignment. Although NCL records indicate that Mr. Ison requested NCL to assign Mr.
Shupe a less expensive cabin, that act did not derive from the letter requesting more
funds. In fact, Mr. Shupe testified at trial that despite the letter Mr. Ison agreed not to
charge him or his group any additional funds. R. 389: 99-101. The crime of
communications fraud applies to persons who devise a scheme to communicate with
another "by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material
omissions. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (1999). Mr. Ison was not "convicted"
for assigning Mr. Shupe to a less expensive cabin. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(l)(b)
(1999). Rather, Mr. Shupe and Mr. Ison had a separate civil dispute over the cabin
assignment.
Likewise, Ms. Burback did not suffer any damages based on the representations in
the letter. Instead, she claimed that Mr. Ison had promised to pay her commissions for
the passengers she booked on the cruise. But, Mr. Ison was not "convicted" of depriving
Ms. Burback of commissions. Id, Again, this was a separate civil dispute that had no
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connection to the October 1K 1995 letter.
Case law establishes that neither Mr. Shupe nor Ms. Burback were entitled to
restitution. In GailL the trial court ordered the defendant to pay restitution for the money
his family had forfeited when the defendant skipped bail an J fled to another state. 967
P.2d at 937. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that because the defendant had not been
convicted of bail jumping and never admitted responsibility for that crime, the
defendant's family members were not victims under the restitution statute. Id. at 937-38.
Similarly, in State v. Mast. 2001 UT App 402, ^|5, 40 P.3d 1143, although the
defendant only pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property for some items taken in a
burglary, the trial court ordered her to pay restitution for all the property stolen during the
burglary. This Court ruled that the trial court lacked authority to impose restitution for a
crime for which the defendant "was not convicted and for which she admitted no
responsibility." IcL at ^fl6. This Court reached the same conclusion in Watson, where the
defendant pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice for selling a car that she drove in
fleeing from a murder. 1999 UT App 273,1J2, 987 P.2d 1289. This court held that the
sentencing judge improperly "made inferences" that the defendant was involved in the
murder and unlawfully ordered her to pay restitution for that crime. Id. at^[5.
Despite the lack of authority to impose restitution, defense counsel failed to timely
object to the restitution award. Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-20l(4)(e) (1999)
requires criminal defendants to object to restitution awards "at or before sentencing."
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State v. Weeks. 2000 UT App 273,1{9. 12 P.3d 110. affirmed on other grounds . 2002 UT
98, 61 P.3d 1000. Defense counsel did not object at or before the sentencing hearing,
but, rather, filed a motion challenging the restitution award one month after sentencing.
R. 313. The failure to object at or before sentencing without good cause waives the right
to a restitution hearing. Weeks. 2000 UT 273, ^[10, 12 P.3d 110. Because Mr. Ison
could have successfully challenged the restitution award, defense counsel unreasonably
failed to file a timely objection. Templin. 805 P.2d at 186
This failure prejudiced Mr. Ison. Id_ at 187. Mr. Shupe and Ms. Burback were
not entitled to restitution, therefore, the trial judge's restitution award was unlawful.
Galli, 967 P.2d at 937-38. Defense counsel's failure to file a timely objection resulted in
Mr. Ison paying, at least, $1,273.55 more than he should have. This, this Court should
vacate the restitution award for the amounts paid to Mr. Shupe and Ms. Burback.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Ison requests this Court to reverse his convictions for the lack of evidence. In
the alternative, Mr. Ison requests a remand for the appointment of new counsel and a new
trial and the vacation of the unlawful portions of the restitution award.
Submitted, this £* day of April, 2003.

KENT R. HART
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Addendum A

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999): Communications Fraud
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from another money, property, or
anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who
communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme
or artifice is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property,
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is less than
$300;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property,
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property,
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or
exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property,
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or
exceeds $5,000; and
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or
artifice to defraud is other than the obtaining of something of
monetary value.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under
Subsection (1) shall be measured by the total value of all
property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained
by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except
as provided in Subsection (l)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary
element of the offense described in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense
described in Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any
person of property, money, or thing of value is not a
necessary element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of
executing or concealing a scheme or artifice described in
Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of communication
fraud.
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means
to bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by
way of information; to talk over; or to transmit information.

(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to
use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television,
newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless
the pretenses, representations, promises, or material
omissions made or omitted were made or omitted
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the
truth.

Addendum B

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants various fundamental rights:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time
of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.

Addendum C

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants, among other rights, the right to counsel:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Addendum D

Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides all persons the right to due
process of law: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law."

Addendum E

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution includes the right to counsel in
criminal cases:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall
not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense.

Addendum F

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(m) details the procedures for trial courts to
follow when receiving questions from juries:
After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be
informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall
inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate
such request to the court. The court may then direct that the
jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the
inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be
given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its
discretion respond to the inquiry in writing without having the
jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and the
response thereto shall be entered in the record.

Addendum G

Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-201 (1999) defines in relevant part the trial
court's authority to impose restitution:
(1) As used in this section:

(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense
of which the defendant is convicted or any other
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or
without an admission of committing the criminal
conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special
damages, but not general damages, which a
person could recover against the defendant in a
civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities
and includes the money equivalent of property
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed,
and losses including earnings and medical
expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or
nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim, including the accrual of interest from the
time of sentencing, insured damages, and
payment for expenses to a governmental entity
for extradition or transportation and as further
defined in Subsection (4)(c).
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court
may sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the
following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from
public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise
specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in
prison without parole; or

(0 to death.

(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other
sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant
make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this
subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed
to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes of
restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection
(l)(e).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the
court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in
Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d).

Addendum H

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 971018177 FS

LEW ISON,

Judge:
Date:

Defendant.

L. A. DEVER
November 29, 1999

PRESENT
Clerk:
audreyj
Prosecutor: CHARLENE BARLOW
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID GRINDSTAFF
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: February 3, 1947
Video
Tape Number:
video
Tape Count: 11-39-36
CHARGES
1. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/01/1999 Guilty
2. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/01/1999 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Case No: 971018177
Date:
Nov 29, 1999

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 30 day(s) in
the Salt Lake County Jail.

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

$5000.00
$4000.00
$459.46
$1000.00

Charge # 2

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

$5000.00
$4000.00
$459.46
$1000.00

Total Fine
Total Suspended
Total Surcharge
Total Principal Due

$10000.00
$8000.00
$918.92
$2000.00
Plus Interest

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Amount: $3717.15 Plus Interest
Restitution:
Pay in behalf of STATE TO PROVIDE
SCHEDULED TIMEPAY
The following cases are on timepay 971018177.
The defendant is to pay $250.00 monthly on the 30th.
The number of payments scheduled is 24.
The first payment is due on 1/30/2000 the final payment of $152.17
is due on 01/30/2002. The final payment may vary based on
interest.

Page 2
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Case No: 971018177
Date:
Nov 29, 1999
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 30 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail.
Defendant is to report by December 3, 1999 by 5:00 p.m..
Defendant is to pay a fine of 2000.00 which includes the surcharge,
Interest may increase the final amount due.
Pay fine to The Court.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Violate no laws.
/

Dated t h i s

fL day of H^\^V-( . l 9 i l .

,

DistrivcJ^Court Judge

00263
Paap ^

Hast)

Addendum I

P 0 Boy C25403, Miami, Florida 33102-5403
1-800-327-7030

VOYAGE: 06951126

B

REQUEST #: 15

ISSUE DATE: 06/01/95

GROUP INFORMATION

TRAVEL AGENT INFORMATION
— • • — •

'

^

—

—

•

^

SHIP: M/S SEAWARD

ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL
CONTACT: LEE
1 106 W 500 SOUTH
SUITE 1C4

—

^

, or

PAGE
^

^

—

—

—

—

i
^

—

—

.

SAILING OATE: 11/26/95

GROUP CONFIRMATION NO: 85553
GROUP NAME: HADSEN GROUP

BOUNTIFUL, UT. 84010 US

7

SALES MANAGER: MINDY ALLEN

j

(801) 292-7273

ALL RATES QUOTED ARE IN U.S. DOLLARS ALL CABIN RATES ARF PER PERSON BASED ON DOUR! F OGCl IPANCY; TO.IPL«E AND QUAD
CABINS ARE ON A R -.QUEST BASIS. ALL PACKAGE RATES ARE PER PERSON. NOTE: AIR ADD-ON MUST BE APPLIED WHERE APPLICABLE.
FOR CRUISE ONLY GROUPS PLEASE INQUIRE ABOUT OUR GROUP TRANSPORTATION SERVICES.

GROUP CABIN SPACE:
NO. OF
CATEGORY CABINS

A
B
C

K

^

3
3
16
7
3
8
2
12
12

D

D
c

V

G

J
J
A/S«AI R/SEA

QUOTED
FARE

DISC

890.10
876.60
773.10
773.10
849.60
719.10
809.10
1131.75
1131.75

0.00
0.00

PCT

o.n^

o
.>
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

C/O 'CRUISE ONLY

3/4 FARES

GOVT BOOKNG
TYPE

DISC
FARE

COMM
PCT

PORT
CHARGE

TAX

890.10
876.60
773.10
773.10
849.60
719.10
809.10
1131.75
1131.75

17.00
17.00
17.00
17.00
17.00
17.00
17.00
17.00
17.00

102.00
102.00
102.00
102.00
102.00
102.00
102.00
102.00
102.00

12.50
12.50
12.50
12.50
12.50
12.50
12.50
12.50
12.50

l/R« INDUSTRY RATE

A/S
A/S
A/S
A/S
A/S
A/S
A/S

ADD-ON
ADD-ON
ADD-ON
ADD-ON
ADD-ON
ADD-ON
ADD-ON

(SEE
(SEE
(SEE
(SEE
(SEE
(SEE
(SEE

BELOW)
BELOW)
BELOW)
BELOW)
BELCW)
BELOW)
BELOW)

A/S
A/S

BUS-3US RIDE

TOUR CONDUCTOR
ADD-ON
PAX

ADULT

CHILD

749.00

749.00

T.B.A.

GROUP AIR SPACE REQUEST:

CITY
CODE

AIR
ADD-ON

PASSENGER FARE /
VALID CATEGORY RANGE
CATEGORY OS THRU R2

F/T ADULT

CATEGORY OS THRU V

F/T ADULT

SLC

459.00

SLC

O.UO

SLC

459.00

CATEGORY OS THRU R2

F/T ADULT

SLC

0.00

CATEGORY OS THRU R2

3/4 ADULT

ON
ON REQUEST

PAYMENT/REVIEW SCHEDULE:
OPTION:
FINAL DUE:
CABINS:

66

12/15/94
07/27/95
09/25/95

/ H0

1600.00
11200.00

> ^

REVIEW:
REVIEW:

DINING:

06/27/95
08/26/95

WAITLISTED

CONFIRMATION REMARKS:
$ 2 0 0 . /PP Sc NAMES DUE IN HOUSE 7 DAYS
AFTER CABIN ASSIGNMENT.
RATES INCLUDE
*STARWARD DISPLACEMENT GRP NO UPGRADES*
CHILD TRAVELING AS 2ND PAX IN CABIN PAYS ADULT FARE.
ONLY SNGLS PAYING DBL FARE E L I G I B L E FOR GRP RATE 8b T C .

THE ABOVE IS BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED NCL AT THE TIME OF ISSUANCE OF THIS AGREEMENT.
Please review both sides of this Group Agreement and sign below to indicate that you understand and aooept these Terms and Conditions. A signed oopy
must be faxed or returned to our offioe within 30 days of issue date along with your initial deposit to P.O.Box 025403, Miami, Florida 33102-5403. Group
options and review dates are strictly observed. Your space will be automatioally oanoelled unless you contact us by the option date or if you fail to send the
initial and/or second confirming deposit.
ACCEPTANCE OF THIS GROUP AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES ACCEPTANCE OF ALL TERMS & CONDITIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE
PASSENGER TICKET CONTRACT OF PASSAGE AND GENERAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE CRUISE GUIDE IN EFFECT AT THE BSUE
DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT.

^rcup Terms & Conditions
Group Size R e q u i r e m e n t *
Fo 3 4 and 7-day cruises Norwegian Cruse Line requires that a group consists of at least 15 full ac\jt fare paying passengers occupying a minimum of 6 cabnt
ongercruises rmnimum requirements may vary

For specai and

Tour Conduotora
Standard group poicy allows one complimentary Tour Conductor for every 15 full aduft fare p a y r g p a s : jngen The 16th passenger will be the complimentary Tour Conductor berth
Fo special and longer cruses the Tour Conductor allowance may vary The Tour Conductor allowance will be credited r the category n when the majority of the group space has
been sod however r e Tour Conductor can be berthed at Norwegian Cruise I r e s discretion As long a . the majority of the group is on the Air/Sea program Tour Conductors are
awa ded compi mentary a from the a r crry that is holding the most space n the group In the event that \n Air/Sea add-on is appicable ft shall also apply to any Tour Conductor
Th rd and fourth passengers do not count towards the Tour Conductor Srgles payrg 200% of the full fare count as two passengers for Tour Conductor purpose Srgies p a y r g a
mm mum of 150% of the full tare w H count as one passenger for Tour Conductor purpose Tour Conductors are non-dscountabte and non-commissonabie

Disoounts
Grouo fares ?"> air»ady dscojnted arc net subject to other discount programs not spectfcalfy applicable to the sailrg and/or the group Fares exclude port charges government
taxes and fees Singles within the group must pay 200% of the full adult fare A child travelrg as the second passenger r a c a b r pays the full adult fare Should the number of full
tdrt paying adurt passenqers n the group fall below the size requirement all group discounts Tour Conductor allowances and any other consideration will be withdrawn Tour
pacKages passenger insurance and Air/Sea add on s are non discountable however they arecommssionable at 10%
Commission
S anaard travel agent commission w II apply to group bookrgs ft Is based on the discounted fare and does not apply to port charges cocktail parties other on board amenities
prepa d graturties government taxes and fees or any other purchases
P r o m o t i o n a l Activity
A variety ot collateral and promotional items are available to assist you r your group marKetrg activities
NOTE Discounted group rates may not be rcluded r any way r the advertising or promotion of group space to the general pubic nor may group space be resold to other travel
agencies Group space cannot be wholesaled Norwegian Cruise L r e reserves the right to cancel all group space whether sold or unsold should this occur
Payments & Cabin Assignments
it s very important to understand that by confirmrg a request for space Norwegian Cruise L r e guarantees confirmation by category not by c a b r location
appi es to all standard groups

The foltowrg polcy

Initial D e p o s i t
$2^ per person deposrt is due 30 days after confirmation
Within 5 months $400 per person deposrt (10+day cruises) $200 per person deposit (7 day cruises) and $100 per person deposit (3 A 4 day cruises) is
required 2 weeKs after confirmation
Wrtnm 60 days of sailing (7+ day cruises) or within 45 days of sailrg (3 & 4 day cruises) any new group requires f r a l payment and roomrg 1st r-tiouse
wrthm 48 hours of conf rmation
S e c o n d Deposrt
$375 per Derson deposrt for 10+ day cruises $175 per person deposit for 7 day cruises or $75 per person deposit tor 3 & 4 day cruises s due at 4 months
(120 days prior to sailing) This second deposrt is not for cabin assignment - this deposrt is to contrue to hold space from 4 to 2 months prior to sailrg with
Norweg an Cruise L r e s approval
Wrthm 5 months $400 per person deposrt for 10+day cruises $200 per person deposit for 7 day cruises or $100 per person deposrt for 3 & 4 day cruises s
required 2 weeks after confirmation
Wrthr 60 days of sailing (7+ day cruises) or wlthr 45 days of sailrg (3 & 4 day cruises) any new group requires f r a l payment and roomrg 1st r-house
wrthr 48 hours
NOTE For holiday sailmqs certain theme cruses repositioning cruses and cruises longer than 10 days a second confirmrg deposrt of $375 per person for
10+ day cruses $175 per person for 7 day cruises or $75 per person for 3 & 4 day cruses will be required 5 months prior to sailrg
Cabin Assignment
$ 375 per person deposit for 10+ day cruses $175 per person for 7 day cruses or $75 per person for 3 & 4 day cruses will be required wlthr 7 days
should ass anment be do^e before the second deDosrf is received
If second deposrt has already been receved cabin assignment will be done without additional deposrt requirement
NOTE

Passenger names and r the case of Air/Sea groups

air city will be required before a c a b r can be assigned

Final P a y m e n t
No later that 60 days prior to sailing (7+ day cruses) or 45 days prior to sailrg (for 3 & $ day cruses) f r a l payment and roomrg 1st must be r house
For groups booked on holiday sailings certain theme cruises reposrtionrg cruses or cruses longer than 7 days f r a l payment and roomrg Ists are due
in house 90 days prior to sailing
Name Changes
Name changes are not permitted wrthout the written approval of Norwegian Cruse L r e
$20 per person will be assessed for each change

When changes are made to Air/Sea bookrgs that require ressue of air tckets a charge ot

Spaoe Review/ Adjustment
Norwegian Cruse Line reserves the right to reclaim any or all unsold space at any time that s c a b r s for when confirmrg deposit and names have not been received It s your
responsibility to advise Norwegian Cruise Line of your sales progress to provide the required deposits and names r a timely manner and to submit sample copies of appicable
promotional material Beginning at 6 months prior to sailing Norwegian Cruse Line will contact you every 30 days to review the progress of your sales While Norweqian Cruse
Line may recall any or all unsold space or space held without names at any time you may continue to sell provided group space is available so that you may achieve the greatest
possible success from your efforts
C a n c e l l a t i o n Polioy
C a b r s canceled after the Final Payment date will be assessed the following per person charges
T*r»e & Four Day Cruises
Seven Day Cruises
45 30 days prior to sailrg
29 4 days prior to sailing

$50
$100

60 30 days prior to sailrg
29 4 days prior to sailing

Repositioning Cruises,
10+ day, Holiday & Theme Cruises
$100
$200

90 60 days prior to sailing
59 4 days prior to sailrg

$200
$400

There will be no refund for "no-shows" or cancellations that occur less than 4 days prior to sailing day
Refund requests must be In wrrtrg and accompanied with all documents Refund processing time s approximately 4 to 6 weeks after sailrg date
Other Important Group Information
Groups will be automatcalfy canceled should any of the scheduled payments not be r house by due date
For Groups of 100 passengers or more and incentive groups deposits payment and cancellation schedules are subject to other Terms & Conditions
Failure to identify a "Student Group may result r the cancellation of the group and/or r the passengers b e r g denied boarding at the Pier Norwegian Cruse
L r e allows Student Groups to sail between Easter and the second week r June and September through the second week r December Student Groups
are excluded from certain theme repositioning holiday Easter sailings as well as cruses in the Bermuda and Alaska markets Student Groups cannot
oA^eouo v,av
00 siuufcms pe sup A Siuuem Gioupb win oe assignea mam seating ummg uepenurgon uiegioup rmai oeposit ana I our oonauctor
polcies vary A Securrty Deposrt of $50 per student minimum of $1000 per group is required at the time of f r a l payment This deposrt will be refunded upon
written request provided no damage has been sustared by Norwegian Cruise Line One adult chaperone 25 years or older must accompany even/ ten
students A Parent/Guardian Consent and Release Form must be completed and signed for each mror and returned to the Passenger Courtesy Department
at time of f r a l payment Any mror failing to have this form completed and signed by a parent/guardian may be denied boardrg You may obtar this form by
callrg our Passenger Courtesy Department In addition all Student Groups must prepay all on board graturties
All reservations are subject to change in the event of a full ship charter and/or itinerary change
Triple/Quad c a b r s are limited and are available on a request basis only Third and Fourth passengers cannot be guaranteeeed by the travel agent to their
client until prior confirmation has been obtared from Norwegian Cruise L r e
On Air/Sea passengers Norwegian Cruse L r e will only block air space upon receipt of second (confirmrg) deposit air/sea city and passenger names This
s to prevent any untimely release or nonuse of air space close to sailing date Late submission of rooming lists and final payment may result r air allocations
b e r g revoked by the airlines If we are unable to secure air for your booking at that time the group will be reverted to cruse only status
Insurance
Trip cancellation protection is available for any passenger who s part of the group Payment must be made no later than the groups f r a l payment date Insurance payments are
paid separately and should be mailed directly to Norwegian Cruise Lines Accounting Department ATT Insurance Desk P O Box 025403 Miami Florida 33102 5403
Assistance
The Group Servces Department will assist you with all your group needs after the initial bookrg (e g additions deletions changes payment or general information)
servces (e g amenrties cocktail parties meeting rooms passengers wrfn certar medcal condrtions) contact our Passenger Cou tesy Department
R e m e m b e r , N o r w e g i a n C r u i s e Line # 1 in S e r v i o e w i t h 1 N u m b e r
1 - 8 0 0 - 3 2 7 - 7 0 3 0 or 3 0 5 - 4 4 5 - 0 8 6 6 ( M i a m i )
Touch 1) Individual Reservation
Touch 2) Group Reservations / Group Servces
Touch 3) Sales Servce
Touch 41 Paaaenaer Courtesv
Touch 5) Brochures
Touch 6) Refunds

For special

Addendum J

NAME
MADSEN GROUP

TYPE (l/G) G

RES 85553

T

AGENT 801 292-7273 PORTS SJU SJU
l.GRP RES: LSF
RQO
11/15/94
GREEN SAILING
RQO
11/15/94
NOT A STUDENT GRP
RQO
11/15/94
OFFERED INSURANCE
RQO
11/15/94
2.RES-HILARY/GWEN ADV T/A JOHN THAT THE CC IN THE
RMH
12/15/94
AMOUNT OF $800 FOR PASSENGERS OWENS WAS DECLINED
RMH
12/15/94
JOHN ADV THAT HE WILL HAVE THE T/A CALL THE CLIENT
RMH
12/15/94
AND GIVE US A CALL BACK.
(GWEN)
RMH
12/15/94
LM FOR T/A JOHN $4400.00 ADDL $ DUE 1WEEK FOR
NBS
01/19/95
CBNS ASSIGNED OR 11 CBNS WILL BE UNASSIGNED.
NBS
01/19/95
3. GRP SERV- STARWARD DISPLACEMENT OK PER T/A JOHN
RY4
02/21/95
TO MOVE FROM 20951124 TO SEAWARD 06951226 RATES
RY4
02/21/95
PROTECTED. NO MOVE UPGRADES AT THE PROTECTED
RY4
02/21/95
RATE IF THEY WANT MORE UPGARDES THEY PAY THE
RY4
02/21/95
CURRENT RATE.
RY4
02/21/95
## EXPIRED CABIN OPT ALL CAT I CABINS CXLD ALSO
NA0
03/07/95
?F2=FWD
PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN
PF12=ARM
PAGE:
1 OF 13
2NTER TYPE (l/G) AND BOOKING NUMBER...
ENTER SELECTION NUMBER -- **

ISM0183
NAME
MADSEN GROUP

G EN E R A L

NOTES

OPTION (A,I,U) I
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553

T

AGENT 801 292-7273 PORTS SJU SJU
03/07/95
PER NOTES ON FRONT PAGE THIS GRP NOT TO RECEIVE
NA0
UPGRADES-BJJ
03/07/95
NA0
04/06/95
GRP RESV-T/A JOHN BOOKED CABIN 8004
RXD
**7 MONTH
04/27/95
NB3
04/27/95
TTL=64 SLD=10 CUT=0 REM=64
NB3
06/01/95
GRP RESV - DSM MINDY ALLEN XL FIT BKG#5010543
RKS
06/01/95
CBN#4015, BKG#5020203 CBN#4006/ TRANS
RKS
06/01/95
RKS
TO THIS GROUP AT CURRENT GRP RATE.
06/01/95
RKS
AVO DONE TO TRANS $400 FOR EACH CABIN.
08/04/95
NB3
**4 MONTH
08/04/95
NB3
TTL=66 SLD=53
08/04/95
TTL=66 SLD=53 CUT=0 REM=66
NB3
08/04/95
NB3
ADVISED JOHN, HE NEEDS TO SEND AN ADD'L $7400 IN
08/04/95
NB3
ORDER TO KEEP THE CBNS FROM CANCELING. HE ADVISED
08/04/95
HE WAS GOING TO CUT A CHECK TODAY. I WAS NOT ABLE
NB3
08/04/95
TO ASSIGN ALL CBNS. I STILL OWE THE FOLLOW:
NB3
2 OF 13
PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN
PF12=ARM
PAGE:
**
ENTER SELECTION NUMBER

RSMUlbJ
NAME
MADSEN GROUP

ti £ JN £ K A L

NOTES

OPTION (A,I,UJ I
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553

T

AGENT 801 292-7273 PORTS SJU SJU
***8 MONTH REVIEW
REU
03/31/95
TTL:60 SLD:12 CUT:0 REM:60
REU
03/31/95
***8 MONTH REVIEW-CORRECTION
REU
03/31/95
TTL:60 SLD:9 CUT:0 REM:60-CBN#7015 7215 8017 CXLD
REU
03/31/95
DUE TO EXP OPT
REU
03/31/95
5 MOS WITH JOHN
NAA
06/30/95
TTL-66 SLD-55 CUT-0 REM-66 ADV WE NEED ADD $9000
NAA
06/30/95
NAA
FOR 55 CBNS SLD I WILL GIVE ASSIGNMENTS FOT A TTL
06/30/95
OF 33 & WILL ASSIGN REST WHEN $ RECD'
NAA
06/30/95
NAA
06/30/95
WILL FAX CBN #'S AND JOHN WILL FAX BACK RM LIST
NAA
06/30/95
SLD 3 CAT A,16 CAT C,8 CAT D, 24 CAT J, 2 CAT G,
NAA
06/30/95
2 CAT F
NB3
09/19/95
SPOKE TO JOHN, RE. FINAL. HE ASKED ME THE NEW ITIN
NB3
09/19/95
FOR THE SHIP SINCE THE PAX COUNT WILL BE REFLECTED
NB3
09/19/95
ON THE CHANGE. HE ADVISED ME HE WILL NOT HAVE A
NB3
09/19/95
FNL COUNT UNTILL MONDAY.
PAGE:
3 OF 13
PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN
PF12=ARM
**
ENTER SELECTION NUMBER

RSM0183

G E N E R A L

NOTES

NAME
MADSEN GROUP

OPTION (A,I,U) I
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553

AGENT 801 292-7273 PORTS SJU SJU
NB3
CAT J-17 CBNS AND CAT C-13 CBNS. I ADVISED JOHN,
TO SEND A ROOMING LIST.
NB3
NB3
SEE 2ND PAGE OF NOTES FOR THE FIRST PART OF THIS
REVIEW.
NB3
R2N
GRP RESV- T/A LOU CALLED TO TELL ME THAT THE OLD
R2N
AGENT ON THIS RES IS TAKING THE MONEY FR
R2N
FROM THE CLIENTS AND HE IS NO LONGER
R2N
WORKING FOR THE COMPANY. LOU WANTS NO
R2N
ONE BUT HIMSELF AND JOHN DO BE ABLE TO
R2N
GET ON THIS RECORD..THE NEW # TO THE AGE
R2N
AGENCY IS 8014849800
RPD
SPOKE TO LYNN IN GRUP SERVICES ADV T/A "LOU"" REQ
RPD
A 48 HR PERIOD TO GET ROOMING LIST AND MONIES IN
RPD
LYNN SAID O.K. BUT
CABINS MUST BE RLS TODAY
RPD
LOU AGREED HE WOULD CALL IN AND RLS..ALLISON 2798
PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN

PF12=ARM
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TYPE (I/G) G

RES 0085553

AGENT 801 292-7273 PORTS SJU SJU
**FINAL
09/25/95
NB3
TTL=66 SLD=49 CUT=17 REM=49
09/25/95
NB3
GRP SERV--SENT REQUEST TO REFUNDS TO CREDIT CC FOR
RWV
10/12/95
$2058 AS CARD WAS DOUBLE CHARGED.
10/12/95
RWV
10/23/95
RPD
##PM#M4########################################
10/23/95
RPD
T / A CALLED LOU TO ADVISE THAT ALL PAX ARE IN GOOD
10/23/95
RPD
STANDING EXCEPT FOR 5 PARTIES
10/23/95
RPD
1. NAY
10/23/95
RPD
2. BILLS
10/23/95
RPD
3. BIRCH
10/23/95
RPD
4. JOHNSTONS
RPD
10/23/95
5. PARKER
RPD
10/23/95
THESE NEED TO PAY AGAIN IN ORDER TO SECURE THEIR
10/23/95
RPD
CABIN
ALLISON X2798
RPD
10/24/95
**************************************************
10/24/95
RPD
*********************5gg NEXT PAGE****************
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PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN
PF12=ARM
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RSM0183

NAME
MADSEN GROUP

G E N E R A L

N O T E S

OPTION ( A , I , U )

TYPE (I/G) G

I

RES 0085553

T

AGENT 801 292-7273 PORTS SJU SJU
SALES - FYI FOR OUR INFO O N L Y > » » » » » » » »
RPD
10/24/95
HAVE SPOKE TO NAY'S AND BIRCH'S RE: THE FACT THEY
RPD
10/24/95
HAVE TO CXL AS BOTH PARTIES ONLY HAVE A UCC IN THE
RPD
10/24/95
AMT OF $400.00 HERE. MADE AN OFFER TO BOTH THESE
RPD
10/24/95
PARTIES TO WAIVE PENALTIES... SINCE THEY WOULD
RPD
10/24/95
CRUISE IF WE WOULD HAVE REC FINAL WHICH THEY PAID
RPD
10/24/95
BY CHECK AND IT WAS CASHED BUT NEVER SENT INTO NCL
RPD
10/24/95
ALSO, ADV IF THEY WANTED TO TRY TO SAIL WE WOULD
RPD
10/24/95
BOOK THEM INDIVIDUALLY AND OFFER A SPECIAL RATE OF
RPD
10/24/95
$399.00 PP PLUS $459 AIR ADD-ON PLUS PORT CHARGES.
RPD
10/24/95
THIS WAY THEY WOULD STILL HAVE TO PAY AGAIN BUT
RPD
10/24/95
THEY COULD REC A LOWER FARE AND STILL CRUISE W GRP
RPD
10/24/95
ALSO, NCL WOULD OFFER THE OTHER 3 COUPLES THE
RPD
10/24/95
SAME RATE HOWEVER SINCE WE SUPPOSEDLY DO NOT HAVE
RPD
10/24/95
ANY OF THEIR MONIES WE WOULD JUST BK THEM IN F.I.T
RPD
10/24/95
PENALTIES WILL BE ACCESSED TO CONTINENTAL FOR ANY
RPD
10/24/95
PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN
PF12=ARM
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TYPE ( I / G ) G RES 0 0 8 5 5 5 3
T

AGENT 8 0 1 2 9 2 - 7 2 7 3 PORTS SJU SJU
CABINS CXL, I ADVISED LOU OF SUCH AS NOW 2 COUPLES
RPD
10/24/95
WANT TO CXL BECAUSE THE NAYS AND BIRCHS ARE NOT
RPD
10/24/95
GOING
ONE OF THESE PAXS SPOKE TO ME AND ARE
RPD
10/24/95
AWARE OF PENALTIES
LOU IS TRYING TO SAY SOMEONE
RPD
10/24/95
ADVISED HIM WE WOULD WAIVE PENALTIES BUT SINCE DAY
RPD
10/24/95
ONE WE ADVISED PENALTIES IN AFFECT
PLZ NOTE
RPD
10/24/95
SINCE LOU TOOK OVER WE HAVE LOWERED OUR FARES BY
RPD
10/24/95
USING UPGRADES THAT ARE BEING OFFERED. LOU IS
RPD
10/24/95
STILL CHARGING PAXS MORE MONEY (UP TO $274PP) AND
RPD
10/24/95
ADVISED ITS TO MAKE UP FOR THE DIFFERENCE PAXS PD
RPD
10/24/95
BY CASH..BUT
HE'S STILL MAKING THOSE 5 COUPLES
RPD
10/24/95
PAY AGAIN.
RPD
10/24/95
***LOU CALLED ADV HE WILL APPROACH NAYS AND BIRCH
RPD
10/24/95
AND GIVE THEM 2 T.C.BERTHS AND PUT THEM IN QUAD
RPD
10/24/95
AND HAVE THEM PAY DIFFERENCE... HE SAYS HE WILL
RPD
10/24/95
GIVE HIS CABIN UP. (BUT THAT CBN IS NOT A T.C RATE
RPD
10/24/95
PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN
PF12=ARM
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*SM0183
NAME
MADSEN GROUP

G E N E R A L

NOTES

OPTION (A,I,U) I
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553

AGENT 801 292-7273 PORTS SJU SJU
10/24/95
AND IT WOULD BE PENALIZED IF HE CXL... HE WANTS TO
RPD
10/24/95
CXL 2 CABINS OUT OF THREE I ADV WE WOULD NOT
RPD
10/24/95
PENALIZE THE NAYS AS THEY WOULD BE TRAVELING BUT
RPD
10/24/95
AS A THIRD AND FOURTH...WITH THE BIRCHS . THIS
RPD
10/24/95
OFFER WAS MADE DUE TO THESE COUPLES CIRCUMSTANCES.
RPD
10/24/95
IF PAXS DOES NOT ACCEPT OFFER DUE TO THEIR
RPD
10/24/95
FINANCIAL SITUATIONS THE OWENS AND HEAPS WILL CXL
RPD
10/24/95
TOO. (UNDER PENALTY AS THEY ARE PD IN FULL)
RPD
10/25/95
***SENT REQUEST TO REFUNDS TO CREDIT CC FOR PAX
RWV
10/25/95
RWV
JOHNSON FOR $200.
10/25/95
RWV
***SENT REQUEST TO REFUNDS TO CREDIT CC FOR PAX
10/25/95
RWV
BIRCH FOR $400 PER S/A.
10/25/95
RWV
***SENT REQUEST TO REFUNDS TO CREDIT CC FOR PAX
10/25/95
RWV
NAY FOR $400 PER S/A.
10/25/95
RWV
CANCELLED 6 CABINS WITH ALLISON ASSESSING PENALTY
10/25/95
RWV
TO 4 OF THE CABINS. WAIVED ON 2 PER S/A.
8 OF 13
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RSMUlbJ
NAME
MADSEN GROUP
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NOTES

UPT1UN IA, I,UJ 1
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553

AGENT 801 292-7273 PORTS SJU SJU
RWV
SENT REQUEST TO REFUNDS TO CREDIT CC FOR PAX OWENS
10/27/95
RWV
FOR $2458, PAX HEAP FOR $2258, PAX FOWLES FOR $200
10/27/95
RWV
10/27/95
PAX LUPTON FOR $400 AND PAX LARSON FOR $879.
****SALES SPOKE TO LOU TO ADV HIS BAL WAS$10954.36
RPD
10/27/95
RPD
10/27/95
LOU WAS NOT TO HAPPY BY THIS AS HE STATES HIS BAL
REFLECTS AROUND $3500 OR $3900...I EXPLAINED THAT
RPD
10/27/95
RPD
10/27/95
THERE WAS A $1000 PENALTY HE DOES NOT BELIEVE WE
RPD
10/27/95
SHOULD PENALIZE PARKERS, BILLS AND JOHNSTONS I
10/27/95
RPD
TOLD HIM IF THE GRP WAS TO BE HELD UP BY A $600
RPD
10/27/95
BAL I WOULD ""THEN AND ONLY THEN" CONSIDER WAIVING
RPD
10/27/95
PENALTIES
HE ADVISED NCL DOES NOT HELP HIM IN
10/27/95
RPD
HIS SITUATION. I ADV IF WE DID NOT HELP HIM I
RPD
10/27/95
WOULD HAVE NOT LOWERED THE FARES BY USING CURRENT
RPD
10/27/95
UPGRADES AND I WOULD HAVE ADJUSTED HIS COMM TO
RPD
10/27/95
REFLECT THE LOWER AMT WHICH HE IS CONTRACTED AT.
10/27/95
RPD
LOU REQ TO MOVE SHUPE TO CAT J AND CXL HIS CABIN
PAGE:
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RSM0183
NAME
MADSEN GROUP

G E N E R A L

NOTES

OPTION (A,I,U) I
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553

T

AGENT 801 292-7273 PORTS SJU SJU
10/27/95
I ADV LOU HE WOULD BE PENALIZED AS WELL...
RPD
**************************************************
10/27/95
RPD
10/27/95
CURRENT BAL AS FOLLOWS:
RPD
10/27/95
RPD
MUST REFUND TO CC
$7395
10/27/95
AND BAL ON GRP
$1115.83
RPD
10/27/95
RPD
MONIES TO BE PAID
$8510.83
10/27/95
(PRIOR ADV BAL $10954.36)
RPD
10/27/95
RPD
REMEMBER A T/C WAS LOST DUE TO CXL RESERVATIONS
10/27/95
RPD
AND CC REFUNDED TO PAX NOT ON ROOMING LIST
10/30/95
RTF
-SALES- PAX TERRY MILLYARD CALLED TO ASK IF $1000
10/30/95
RTF
HAS BEEN SENT IN BY ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL. SHE INITIA
10/30/95
RTF
LLY PAID THIS BY CHECK/CASH BEFORE THEY WENT UNDER
10/30/95
RTF
AND SHE IS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE MONEY
10/30/95
RTF
WOULD BE SENT IN. HER NUMBER @ WORK IS 801 5248904
10/30/95
RTF
CONTINENTAL TRAVEL TOLD HER THAT SHE STILL OWES
10/30/95
RTF
THEM $1000.
BRIAN X2892
PAGE: 10 OF 13
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RSMUIbJ
NAME
MADSEN GROUP

U U W B K A L

W U T JS b

TYPE (I/G) G

RES 0085553

AGENT 801 292-7273 PORTS SJU SJU
***SALES***
RE: 10/31 5:00 PM
RPD
11/01/95
11/01/95
PLZ NOTE LOU CALLED IN ADVISING HIS CC# FOR FINAL
RPD
11/01/95
RPD
TO CLEAR BAL BY MISTAKE AGENT ACCEPTED AND LOU WAS
11/01/95
UNDER THE IMPRESSION BAL CLEARED
GLENROY IN
RPD
11/01/95
RPD
GRP SERVICES CALLED AGENCY AND SPOKE TO JOHN. ADV
11/01/95
RPD
JOHN THAT THERE WAS A BALANCE AND LOU WAS AWARE OF
11/01/95
RPD
THIS AS WELL AS THE FACT EVERYTHING HAD TO BE ON
11/01/95
RPD
UCC IMPRINT ONLY
11/01/95
RPD
AT THIS TIME TOOK FAX # OUT- UNTIL BAL IS CORRECT
11/01/95
RPD
ON GRP SO NOTHING ""WILL OR SHOULD""BE FAXED TO
11/01/95
RPD
AGENCY (OR LOU) UNTIL MONIES ARE ADJUSTED
11/01/95
RZD
**GRP RES- LOU FROM AGENCY S
11/01/95
RZD
WILL SEND UCC IMPRINTS FROM US MAIL
11/01/95
RZD
EF158113295 US 11/1
11/01/95
RPD
SEE NEXT PAGE
REQ CC CHARGES TO BE PULLED
11/01/95
RPD
AND REFUNDED A.S.A.P ( AMT $7395 )
PAGE: 11 OF 13
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RSM0183

G E N E R A L

NOTES

NAME
MADSEN GROUP

OPTION (A,I,U) I
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553

AGENT 801 292-7273 PORTS SJU SJU
SALES SPOKE TO LOU TODAY
RPD
ADVISED HE HAD TO FLY BACK INTO TOWN AS UTAH
RPD
CONSUMER PROTECTION FILED MON 10/30 SUMMONS AND
RPD
SUBPOENAS ON LOU AND CONTINENTAL TRAVEL...AS WELL
RPD
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAD A HEARING WITH LEE FEIT
RPD
ON TUES 10/31
THIS INFO WAS GIVEN TO ME BY LOU
RPD
*LOU ADV THAT THEY OR HE WAS BLAMING NCL AS THEY
RPD
RPD
WOULD NOT REFUND ANY CASH PAYMENTS
I ADVISED
RPD
LOU ONCE AGAIN THAT IF HE EVER WANTED ANY PAYMENT
RPD
THAT WAS NOT A UCC TO BE PULLED ALL HE HAD TO DO
RPD
IS PUT IT IN WRITING TO US TO HAVE IT REFUNDED OFF
RPD
THE GROUP
ONCE AGAIN HE ADV "I CAN'T DO THAT".
SBB

PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN

PF12=ARM
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NAME
MADSEN GROUP

G E N E R A L

NOTES

OPTION (A,I,U) I
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553

AGENT 801 292-7273 PORTS SJU SJU
COLLECTIONS- LEFT MESSAGE ON T/A PHONE MAIL TO
DAJ
11/08/95
OBTAIN CREDIT CARDS COPIES. MARIA 4797
DAJ
11/08/95
COLLECTIONS- DOCS REL. MARIA 4797
DAJ
11/08/95
*-DOCS FINAL ML VIA A/B 11/9
DKK
MA2
11/09/95
GRPS-LOU CALLED AT 5:05 PM TO SEE IF $$ FOR PAX
11/14/95
RY2
HEAP HAD BEEN REFUNDED BECAUSE PAX CAME TO
11/14/95
RY2
HIS OFFICE YESTERDAY AND REBOOKED. HE BKD
11/14/95
RY2
THEM IN FIT (5312301) AND WANTED THE $$ TO BE
11/14/95
RY2
TRANSFERRED FROM HERE TO THERE. REFUNDS WAS
RY2
11/14/95
CLOSED AND ALLISON IS OUT SICK; SINCE $$ IS
11/14/95
RY2
HERE DID AN AVO TO TRANSFER THE $$. SENT COPY
RY2
11/14/95
FOR ALLISON KEPT ONE AT MY DESK AND SENT ONE
11/14/95
RY2
TO REFUNDS.
X-2293 SHARON
RY2
11/14/95
11/14/95
RY2
PER DIANA THIS WILL NOT BE DONE BECAUSE HE
RY2
11/14/95
WAS TOLD NOT TO SPEAK TO ANYONE BUT ALLISON.
SWITCHED 7010 FOR 7203 W/ ALLISON (SALES)
NAA
11/17/95
PAGE: 13 OF 13
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Addendum K

LSM0136-036-95124
GROUP ACCTG HISTORY
TYPE G RES/GROUP 0085553
VYG 06951126
AGT# 801 2927273 YYMMDD TO YYMMDD
GROUP TYPE B
T
GROUP NAME MADSEN GROUP
COMB DISC% .0000
COMM% .1900
ADDL SERV
.00
DISC3 .0000
DATE
TIME CD CHG DESC
CHG TO
CHG FROM
OPR
941202 155244 50 CC AUT APP
$200.00
780 D 18401 NAP
941202 155244 50 CC AUT APP FOWLES
NAP
941202 155506 50 CC AUT APP
780 D 09813 NAP
$200.00
941202 155506 50 CC AUT APP JASPER
NAP
941202 155508 50 CC AUT APP
780
D
02823
$200.00
NAP
941202 155508 50 CC AUT APP JOHNSON
NAP
941209 201534 50 CC AUT APP
780 D 26957 RYZ
$400.00
941209 201534 50 CC AUT APP DANIELS,R
RYZ
941209 201622 50 CC AUT APP
780 D 46065 RYZ
$400.00
941209 201622 50 CC AUT APP BARBER,B
RYZ
780 D 14995 NB3
941214 114239 50 CC AUT APP
$400.00
941214 114239 50 CC AUT APP JOHNSON,LYOD
NB3
780
941214 114241 50 CC AUT DEN
$800.00
NB3
941214 114241 50 CC AUT DEN OWENS
NB3
$400.00
780 D 25284 NB3
941214 114242 50 CC AUT APP
F7:CABIN 8:AIR 9:PKG 10 .-DINING 11:LINE CHG 21:CBN CNL 13:ASGN 14:RM LST
PF6:CC HST 12:ARM 15:AIR D/D PAGE 001 OF 009
F2:FWD 4:LAST
PF5:ALL
PF16:NOTES CLEAR:RET
SEL -- **

LSM0136-036-95124

VYG 06<551126

GROUP ACCTG HISTORY

TYPE G RES/GROUP 0085553

AGT# 801 2927273i YYMMDD TO YYMMDD
GROUP TYPE B
GROUP NAME MADSEN GROUP
T
COMB DISC% .0000
COMM% .1900
DISC% .0000
ADDL SERV
.00
DATE
TIME CD CHG DESC
CHG FROM
CHG TO
OPR
941214 114242 50 CC AUT APP BIRCH
NB3
941214 114243 50 CC AUT APP
$400.00
780 D 71810 NB3
941214 114243 50 CC AUT APP NAY
NB3
941214 114429 50 CC AUT APP
$200.00
780 D 78730 RWV
941214 114429 50 CC AUT APP JASPER
RWV
941214 115403 50 CC AUT APP
$400.00
780 D 25519 RWV
941214 115403 50 CC AUT APP OWENS
RWV
941215 105501 50 CC AUT APP
$400.00
780 D 51110 NA0
941215 105501 50 CC AUT APP OWENS
NA0
950110 154733 50 CC CALLBCK
$400.00
780
RDE
950110 154733 50 CC CALLBCK SMITH
RDE
780 D 040552 RDE
950110 154735 50 CC AUT APP
$400.00
RDE
950110 154735 50 CC AUT APP MEASON
780 D 020130 EAF
$400.00
950110 161826 K8 CC MAN APP
780 D 035422 RZ3
$400.00
950206 193053 50 CC AUT APP
PF7:CABIN 8: AIR 9:PKG 10:DINING 11::LINE CHG 21 :CBN CNL 13-.ASGN 14:RM LST
1.-1ST 2::FWD 3:BWD 4:LST PF5::ALL PF6::CC HST 12::ARM 15:AIR D/D PAGE 002 OF 009
SEL - . * *
PF16J-.NOTES CLEAR:RET

RSM0136-036-95124
GROUP ACCTG HISTORY
TYPE G RES/GROUP 0085553
V/G 06951126
AGT# 801 2927273 YYMMDD TO YYMMDD
GROUP TYPE B
GROUP NAME MADSEN GROUP
T
COMM% .1900
COMB DISC% .0000
DISC% .0000
ADDL SERV
.00
CHG FROM
DATE
TIME CD CHG DESC
CHG TO
OPR
950206 193053 50 CC AUT APP CHRISTENSEN,D.
RZ3
$400.00
780 D 027632 RQ0
950215 131616 50 CC AUT APP
$400
950215 131616 50 CC AUT APP EDWARDS
RQ0
950324 173225 50 CC AUT APP
780 D 024256 RVL
$400 00
950324 173225 50 CC AUT APP LUPTON,EARL
4875799
RVL
950327 122104 50 CC AUT APP
780 D 035220 RUR
$400.00
950327 122104 50 CC AUT APP DANIELS
RUR
780 D 055237 RXD
950406 115530 50 CC AUT APP
$400.00
RXD
950406 115530 50 CC AUT APP PARKER,C
780 D 000967 RYM
950406 165419 50 CC AUT APP
$400.00
RYM
950406 165419 50 CC AUT APP KELLER
780 D 038485 RZD
950418 132840 50 CC AUT APP
$2458.00
RZD
950418 132840 50 CC AUT APP PETERSON
780 D 093732 RFB
950512 132244 50 CC AUT APP
$400.00
RFB
950512 132244 50 CC AUT APP HEAP,ELNA
?F7:CABIN 8:AIR 9 PKG 10:DINING 11: LINE CHG 21:CBN CNL 13:ASGN 14:RM LST
L:1ST 2:FWD 3:BWD 4:LST PF5:ALL
PF6: CC HST 12:ARM 15:AIR D/D PAGE 003 OF 009
SEL -- **
PF16:NOTES CLEAR:RET

SM0136 -036-95124
GROUE> ACCTG HISTORY
TYPE G RES/GROUP 0085553
VYG 06951126
AGT# 801 2927272\ YYMMDD TO YYMMDD
GROUP TYPE B
GROUP NAME; MADSEN GROUP
T
COMB DISC% .0000
COMM% .1900
' DISC
:% .oooo
ADDL SERV
.00
DATE
TIME CD CHG DESC
CHG FROM
CHG TO
OPR
950524 135856 50 CC AUT APP
$879.00
780 D 024457 RIL
950524 135856 50 CC AUT APP LARSON
RIL
950605 104453 35 REAPP CASH
$400.00
875 D
UAG
950605 104453 35 REAPP CASH
$400.00
876 D
UAG
EAD
950607 135647 33 CASH ENTRY
012 D
$900.00
010 D
EAF
950615 132835 33 CASH ENTRY
$1200.00
$400.00
780 D 030207 RQA
950630 165802 50 CC AUT APP
RQA
950630 165802 50 CC AUT APP ALEXANDER,ALLYC
$400.00
EAK
027 D
950714 154603 33 CASH ENTRY
$750.00
EAK
016 D
950717 154223 33 CASH ENTRY
$400.00
EAF
021 D
950728 152902 33 CASH ENTRY
EAK
$2400.00
015 D
950825 154810 33 CASH ENTRY
$1000.00
EAK
015 D
950825 154810 33 CASH ENTRY
$751.00
EAK
015 D
950825 154810 33 CASH ENTRY
$2058.00
270 D 000033 EAF
950825 161534 44 CC AUT APP
PF7:CABIN 8:AIR 9:PKG 10:DINING 11::LINE CHG 21:CBN CNL 13:ASGN 14-.RM LST
PF6::CC HST 12:ARM 15:AIR D/D PAGE 004 OF 009
L:1ST 2::FWD 3:BWD 4:LST PF5:ALL
SEL -- **
PF16:NOTES CLEAR:RET
i

RSM0136 -036-95124
GROUP ACCTG HISTORY
TYPE G RES/GROUP 0085553
VYG 06951126
AGT# 801 2927273I YYMMDD TO YYMMDD
GROUP TYPE B
GROUP NAME MADSEN GROUP
T
COMB DISC% .0000
COMM% .1900
DISC% .0000
ADDL SERV
.00
DATE
TIME CD CHG DESC
CHG FROM
CHG TO
OPR
950828 151735 33 CASH ENTRY
050 D
$4796.00
EAF
950905 154902 44 CC AUT APP
$1229.00
200 D 005750 EAK
950905 154904 44 CC AUT APP
$1229.00
200 D 005997 EAK
950905 154906 44 CC AUT APP
$1029.00
200 D 005173: EAK
950914 104225 34 ADJ CASH
$4796.00 020 PAB
950914 105319 34 ADJ CASH
$2919.52 020 PAB
950914 105348 34 ADJ CASH
$2510.44 020 PAB
950918 164459 34 ADJ CASH
$750.00 020 PAB
950920 152251 44 CC AUT APP
$2258.00
201 D 020160 EAF
$1858.00
950920 152253 44 CC AUT APP
201 D 020347 EAF
950920 152255 44 CC AUT APP
$1858.00
201 D 020512 EAF
005 D
$6000.00
EAF
950926 153946 33 CASH ENTRY
005 D
$4000.00
EAF
950926 153946 33 CASH ENTRY
$1858.00
200 D 078719 EAF
950926 163244 44 CC AUT APP
$1859.00
200
EAF
950926 163246 44 CC AUT DEN
PF7:CABIN 8:AIR 9:PKG 10:DINING 11::LINE CHG 21:CBN CNL 13:ASGN 14:RM LST
PF6::CC HST 12:ARM 15:AIR D/D PAGE 005 OF 009
1:1ST 2::FWD 3:BWD 4:LST PF5:ALL
PF16:N0TES CLEAR:RET
SEL -- **

RSM0136'•036-95124
GROUP ACCTG HISTORY
TYPE G RES/GROUP 0085553
VYG 06951126
AGT# 801 29272731 YYMMDD TO YYMMDD
GROUP TYPE B
GROUP NAME MADSEN GROUP
T
COMB DISC% . 0000
COMM% .1900
DISC% . 0000
ADDL SERV
.00
DATE
TIME CD CHG DESC
CHG FROM
CHG TO
OPR
950926 163248 44 CC AUT APP
$1858.00
200 D 782886 EAF
950926 163250 44 CC AUT APP
$2058.00
200 D 078723 EAF
950926 164034 44 CC CALLBCK
$1858.00
201
EAF
950926 164038 44 CC AUT APP
$2058.00
201 D 043153 EAF
950926 164039 44 CC AUT APP
$1858.00
201 D 043166 EAF
950926 164041 44 CC AUT APP
201 D 131250 EAF
$1858.00
$3716.00
201 D 026213 EAF
950926 164041 44 CC AUT APP
201 D 026549 EAF
950926 164047 44 CC AUT APP
$1179.00
950926 164047 44 CC AUT APP
$929.00
201 D 035328 EAF
201 D 078881 EAF
$1858.00
950926 164050 44 CC AUT APP
$2058.00
201 D 026002 EAF
950926 164052 44 CC AUT APP
$2058.00
202 D 026472 EAF
950926 164725 44 CC AUT APP
$1858.00
203 D 026245 EAF
950926 164820 44 CC AUT APP
203 D 026423 EAF
$1858.00
950926 164824 44 CC AUT APP
$1958.00
203 D 026629 EAF
950926 164826 44 CC AUT APP
PF7:CABIN 8:AIR 9:1?KG 10:DINING 11:LINE CHG 21:CBN CNL 13:ASGN 14-.RM LST
PF6:CC HST 12::ARM 15:AIR D/D PAGE 006 OF 009
1:1ST 2::FWD 3:BWD 4:LST PF5:ALL
SEL -- **
PF16>:NOTES CLEAR:RET

RSM0136-036-95124
GROUP ACCTG HISTORY
TYPE G RES/GROUP 0085553
VYG 06951126
AGT# 801 2927273i YYMMDD TO YYMMDD
GROUP TYPE B
GROUP NAME! MADSEN GROUP
T
COMB DISC% .0000
COMM% .1900
DISC% .0000
ADDL SERV
.00
DATE
CHG FROM
TIME CD CHG DESC
CHG TO
OPR
950926 164826 44 CC AUT APP
$1129.00
203 D 026714 EAF
950926 164830 44 CC CALLBCK
$2058.00
203
EAF
950927 101250 K8 CC MAN DEN
$1858.00
201
EAA
950927 101250 K8 CC MAN DEN
$2058.00
203
EAA
950929 160257 44 CC AUT APP
$1858.00
200 D 003362 EAF
951003 122812 50 CC AUT DEN
$1859.00
780
RBJ
951003 122812 50 CC AUT DEN PIERCE
RBJ
951003 123609 50 CC AUT DEN
$1859.00
NBV
780
NBV
951003 123609 50 CC AUT DEN PIERCE
951004 124920 50 CC AUT APP
$1859.00
780 D 000773 NBV
NBV
951004 124920 50 CC AUT APP PIERCE
$1859.00
780
EAA
951004 125106 50 CC AUT DEN
EAA
951004 125106 50 CC AUT DEN PIERCE
$1858.00
780 D 140841 RRE
951006 172238 50 CC AUT APP
RRE
951006 172238 50 CC AUT APP FAUSETT, (:ONNIE
PF7:CABIN 8:AIR 9:1?KG 10-.DINING 11 -.LINE CHG 21:CBN CNL 13-.ASGN 14-.RM LST
PF6 :CC HST 12::ARM 15:AIR D/D PAGE 007 OF 009
1.-1ST 2::FWD 3:BWD 4:LST PF5:ALL
SEL -- **
PFK5:NOTES CLEAR:RET
i

RSM0136 -036-95124
GROUP ACCTG HISTORY
TYPE G RES/GROUP 0085553
VYG 06951126
AGT# 801 292727:1 YYMMDD TO YYMMDD
(3ROUP TYPE B
GROUP NAME MADSEN GROUP
T
COMB DISC% .0000
COMM% .1900
DISC:% .oooo
ADDL SERV
.00
DATE
TIME CD CHG DESC
CHG FROM
CHG TO
OPR
951010 160706 44 CC AUT APP
$2058.00
200 D 095480 EAF
951020 154724 33 CASH ENTRY
028 D
$10000.00
EAD
951020 161320 44 CC AUT APP
$115.00
200 D 042336 EAD
951020 161324 44 CC AUT APP
$115.00
200 D 042337 EAD
951020 161615 44 CC AUT APP
$115.00
270 D 000035 EAD
951020 161617 44 CC AUT APP
$115.00
270 D 000035 EAD
951023 160645 44 CC AUT APP
$2356.00
200 D 023308 EAD
951025 140411 44 CC AUT APP
$115.00
202 D 025899 EAD
951025 140413 44 CC AUT APP
$115.00
202 D 025964 EAD
951025 171931 58 CANCL PNLT
200.00
RWV
951025 171945 58 CANCL PNLT
200.00
RWV
200.()0
RWV
951025 172002 58 CANCL PNLT
200.00
RWV
951025 172016 58 CANCL PNLT
RWV
200.(30
951026 153213 58 CANCL PNLT
200 D 090108 EAF
$230.00
951027 121011 44 CC AUT APP 4758300132318098
PF7:CABIN 8:AIR 9:PKG 10:DINING 11::LINE CHG 21:CBN CNL 13:ASGN 14:RM LST
PF6::CC HST 12::ARM 15:AIR D/D PAGE 008 OF 009
1:1ST 2::FWD 3:BWD 4:LST PF5:ALL
SEL -- **
PF1C5:NOTES CLEAR:RET

RSM0136'•036-95124
GROUP ACCTG HISTORY
TYPE G RES/GROUP 0085553
VYG 06951126
AGT# 8 0 1 2 9 2 7 2 7 3 YYMMDD TO YYMMDD
GROUP TYPE B
GROUP NAME1 MADSEN GROUP
T
COMB DISC% .0000
COMM% . 1 9 0 0
DISC% .0000
ADDL SERV
.00
DATE
TIME CD CHG DESC
CHG FROM
CHG TO
OPR
951027 181020 58 CANCL PNLT
200.00
OA3
9 5 1 0 3 1 150947 44 CC AUT APP
$1000.00
200 D 031752 EAD
9 5 1 0 3 1 164746 50 CC AUT APP
$115.83
780 F 131750 RHO
9 5 1 0 3 1 164746 50 CC AUT APP ISON,LUKE
RHO
951102 120218 34 ADJ CC
$400.00
020 PAB
951102 120252 34 ADJ CC
$400.00
020 PAB
007 F
$6800.00
EAF
951103 145543 33 CASH ENTRY
$2058.00
020 PAB
951120 144551 34 ADJ CC
$400.00
025 EAN
951213 111123 34 ADJ CC
i

PF7:CABIN 8:AIR
PF1:1ST
3:BWD
NO MORE RECORDS

9:PKG

10:DINING 11:LINE CHG 21.-CBN CNL 13:ASGN 14:RM LST
PF5:ALL
PF6:CC HST 12=ARM 15:AIR D/D PAGE 009 OF 009
PF16:NOTES CLEAR:RET
SEL . * *

Addendum L

PURCHASE AGREEMENT
THIS /1REEMENT, made this

<?/ day of August, 1995, by and

between ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL SERVICES, INC,, of Utah, hereinafter
known as "Seller- and COHTXHENTAL TRAVEL, L.L.C. of Utah,
hereinafter known as "Buyer*"
WHEREAS, Buyer desires to buy, and Seller desires to sell to
Buyer, certain assets of Seller's in consideration for the sum of
Sixty Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($60,000), all upon the terms
and conditions hereinafter set forth.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants
herein entered into, be it agreed.
1. On the terms and subject to the conditions herein set
forth, Seller hereby agrees to convey, transfer, assign and
deliver to Buyer, free and clear of any and all encumbrances and
liens, and Buyer agrees to acquire and accept as hereinafter
provided the following assets and property:
All equipment, inventory, assets, cruise and tour bookings,
phone numbers, customer lists, exterior signs, Salt Lake location
equipment and phone numbers (if recovered), and "good will", as
set forth on Schedule "AH, attached hereto, of that certain
business known as Aristocrat Travel, having a value of $60,000.
(Cash on hand and in Seller/s bank accounts are not included.)
2.

As full and complete consideration for Seller's assets

conveyed to Buyer, buyer Agree* to pay Seller as follows:

a.

$10,000, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by

Seller;
b.

The balance of $50,000 as follows:
1)

Fifty (50) percent of all commissions on all

existing cruise groups booked through Seller's agency
or those cruises leaving during November 1995,
December 1995, and January 1996; and
2)

Ten (10) percent of the net profits from all

Buyers locations, included but no limited to Layton
Hills Mall, Bountiful, and 2100 South office; (The net
profit shall be determined by deducting from gross
revenues reasonable operating expenses and
commissions).
3*

Buyer shall not assume any liabilities of Seller.

Further, this sale of assets does not include any transfer of any
interest in Seller's corporation.
4.

The assets and property to be conveyed, transferred, and

assigned and delivered to Buyer shall not include such assets and
property of Seller's as (i) may have been disposed of prior to the
closing date in the ordinary course of business, or in the payment
and discharge of liabilities or obligations on or before closing
date as hereinafter provided, and (ii) may have been otherwise
disposed of prior to the closing date at the request, or with the
consent in writing of Buyer.

5.

To the extent that the assignment of any contract,

license, lease, commitment, sales order or purchase order be
assigned to Buyer as provided herein is not permitted without the
consent of the other party thereto/ this Agreement shall not
constitute an agreement to assign the same if such consent is not
given.
6.

The closing under this Agreement shall take place at

10:00 a.m. on August >K^.9 95, at the business location known as
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.
7. At the closing, the conveyance, transfer, assignment and
delivery of the assets and property of Seller's to Buyer shall be
effected by such full covenant and warranty deeds, bills of sale
with covenants of warranty, endorsements, assignments, and other
good and sufficient instruments of transfer and conveyance as
Buyer shall request.
8. Appropriate forms of such instruments of transfer and
conveyance in conformity with this Agreement shall be submitted to
Buyer by the counsel of Seller for examination within a reasonable
time in advance of the closing date.
9.

Seller agrees that they will, at any time, and from time

to time after the closing date, upon request of Buyer, to execute,
acknowledge and deliver, or will cause to be done, executed,
acknowledged and delivered, all such further acts, deeds,
assignments, transfers, conveyances, powers of attorney and

assurances as may be required in conformity with this Agreement,
or for aiding and assisting in collecting and reducing to
possession, any or all of the assets or property to be assigned to
Buyer as provided herein and any or all obligations of Seller
hereunder*
10.

Any excise, sales, use of other Federal, State or Local

tax levied or assessed by reason of the performance of or arising
as a result of this Agreement, exclusive of any taxes based on net
income, which are payable by Seller, are to be borne by Buyer.
Property taxes levied on the personal property being sold shall be
prorated between Seller and Buyer.
11.

The Seller shall indemnify and hold harmless Buyer in

relation to:
a.

All liabilities and obligations of, or claims

against Seller not expressly assumed herein by Buyer.

(Buyer is

not assuming any liabilities or obligations of Seller*)
b.

Any damage or deficiency due to any breach of

warranty, misrepresentation, or non-fulfillment of any agreement
on the part of Seller's under this Agreement, or from any
misrepresentation or omission from any certificates or other
instrument given, or to be given to Buyer, pursuant to this
Agreement.

-4-

c. All actions/ suits, proceedings, demands,
assessments, judgments, costs, and expenses connected with the
indemnifications and hold harmless set forth in paragraph 11•
12.

Seller shall reimburse Buyer, on demand, for any payment

made by Buyer at any time after the date of this Agreement, or by
Buyer at any time after the closing, with respect to any
liability, obligation, or claim to which the* foregoing indemnity
by Seller relates.
13.

Each party hereto shall have free access to, and right

to make extract copies of ail books and records received or
retained by the other party hereunder which are relevant to this
Agreement.
14.

Seller covenants that pending the closing:
a.

Its business will be carried on only in the

ordinary course.
b.

No contract or commitment will be enter^d^ftito by

or on behalf of Seller extending beyond August JrT 1995, except
ordinary commitments for cruises, tours and airline tickets.
c.

Except as Buyer may otherwise request, and without

making any commitment on its behalf, Seller will utilize its best
efforts to keep its business organization intact; to keep
available to Buyer the services of its present employees; and to
preserve for Buyer the good will of the suppliers and customers of

Seller's and the good will of others with which Seller has
business relations•
d.

Seller will duly comply with the laws of Utah

(including without limitation laws on bulk sales), and with all
such other applicable laws as may be required for the valid and
effective consummation of the sale provided for in this Agreement.
15.

Seller covenants that all deposits for cruise and tour

bookings have been paid over to the cruise line or tour operator.
Any deposits not having been paid over shall be delivered to
Buyer.

On confirmation by Buyer that all cruise and tour deposits

have been paid to the cruise lines, tour operators or received by
Buyer, Buyer assumes all responsibility for the cruise and tour
booking transferred to Buyer.
16.

Seller grants complete exclusivity to Buyer in utili2ing

the aforementioned clients' lists, business files, etc. And
further, Seller covenants that it nor Lee Fiet shall not at any
time, whether alone, jointly or as an agent for another, directly
solicit the persons previously doing business with Aristocrat
travel to do business with another travel office.

However, said

covenant shall not prohibit or prevent Seller from doing business
with former clients of Aristocrat Travel, who without solicitation
by Seller, desire to continue a travel business relationship with
Seller.

Seller is covenant not to compete extends only to the

solicitation by direct contact, written or verbal, to former

L

ents 01 Aristocrat Travel. This covenant does not apply to

ordinary and typical advertising commonly use in a travel agency
business which may attract former clients of Aristocrat Travel.
Further, Seller covenants not to set up, make or encourage ar*y
opposition to the trade or business to be carried on by Buyer as a
result of this Buyer's purchase of assets.
17.

Each party hereto shall pay its own expenses incident to

preparation for carrying this Agreement into effect and
consummating said transactions whether or not the transactions
contemplated hereby are consummated.
18.

This Agreement shall be assignable by Seller or Buyer

with written consent of the non-assigning party.
19. All the terms of this Agreement shall be binding upon,
and inure to the benefit of, and be enforceable by the successors
of the parties hereto.
20.

This Agreement is being delivered, and is intended to be

performed in the State of Utah, and shall be construed and
enforced in accordance with the laws of such state.
21.

Any notice, request, instruction or other document to be

given hereunder by either party hereto, to the other, shall be in
writing and delivered personally or sent by registered mail,
postage prepaid.
22.

This Agreement may be executed simultaneously in two or

more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but

all of which together shall constitute one and the same
instrument.
23.

This instrument contains the entire agreement between

the parties hereto with respect to the transactions contemplated
herein.

The parties hereto may, by mutual agreement, in writing,

(i) extend the time for the performance of any of the obligations
of the parties hereto, (ii) waive; any inaccuracies in the
warranties and representations contained in this Agreement, and
(iii) waive compliance with any of the covenants contained herein
and so waive performance of any of the obligations of the parties
hereto. Any such agreement on the part of the Seller, for any
such extension or waiver, shall be validly and sufficiently
authorized for the purposes of this Agreement, if authorized or
ratified by the Board of Directors or Executive Committee of
Seller and Buyer.
24.

Any dispute between the parties regarding the terms and

conditions of this Agreement shall be first submitted to mediation
prior to the commencement of any litigation to enforce the terms
and conditions of this agreement.

In the event litigation is

necessary to enforce the obligations of each party, the losing

-8-

party agrees to pay all reasonable attorney's fees and costs
incurred in enforcing this Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF", the parties have caused this Agreement to
be du«i.y executed.
BUYER:

SELLER:

CONTINENTAL TRAVEL, L.L.C.

ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL SERVICES, INC.

^^&r-L^

BY: ^ ^ ^ ^ f ; ? <
LEE ?1ET, >Prtsident

r?-i-^

EXHIBIT "A"
OFFICE REFRIGERATOR
YESCO SIGH
MOBILE SIGN
LETTERS FOR SIGN (3 BOXES)
VACUUM
IBM TYPEWRITERS (3)
ZENITH STEREO
CALCULATORS (6)
PREMIER PHONE SYSTEM
PAYMASTER CHECK PROTECTOR
PITNEY/BOWES SCALE UPS
ICOTT/SABRE COMPUTER TERMINALS (4)
SHAW/WALKER EXECUTIVE DESK (1)
7 FT. SECRETARIAL STEEL DESK (1)
6 FT. SECRETARIAL STEEL DESK (3)
SHAW/WALKER CREDENZAS (3)
GRAY STEEL FIRE PROOF FILE CABINET
ANDERSON/HICKERING 4-DRAWER FILE CABINET (2)
OFFICE HIGH EXECUTIVE CHAIR
SHAW/WALKER STENO CHAIRS (4)
CHROME UNITED SIDE CHAIRS (6)
CHROME SHAW/WALKER SWIVEL SIDE CHAIR (4)
INTERIOR WIRING
SOLID OAK BROCHURE RACKS (3) (SMALL)
SOLID OAK BROCHURE RACKS (2) LARGE
PLASTIC BROCHURE RACKS (3)
DIVIDER OFFICE
STEEL CABINETS (2)
MICON MULTI PLEXOR MODEM
TEL TREND
ACRYLIC/GLASS CHAIR MATTS (6)
MINOLTA 320 COPIER
STORAGE TABLES (2)
STORAGE SHELVING (6)
CLOCKS (2) (1 WOOD)
COMPUTER DESK AND HUTCH
COMPUTER CHAIR
TYPEWRITER STAND
BRASS POTS AND PLANTS MISC.
RICOH FAX 20 E
SUPPLY CABINET - STEEL MASTER 30 DRAWER CT140
ENVELOPES/STATIONERY
TICKET JACKETS, MISC.
PETTY CASH BOX/TICKET STEEL FILE BOX
VIDEO LIBRARY (OVER 100)

EXHIBIT "A"
Page 2
ITINERARY STOCK 2 CASES
MISC. OFFICE SUPPLIES
EQUITY IN AT t T COMPUTER TERMINALS
FLIGHT BAGS 310
ACCOUNTING COMPUTER
PRINTER
LEATHER OFFICE SIDE CHAIRS (2)
ARISTOCRAT T-SHIRTS 1,000
COMPUTER LEASE 36 MONTHS PREPAID IF VOLUME STAYS UP
ALL TELEPHONE NUMBERS
ALL EQUIPMENT OF SALT LAKE LOCATION (IF RECOVERED FROM COHENS)
EXTERIOR SIGN AT SALT LAKE LOCATION (IF LANDLORD PERMITS REMOVAL

Addendum M

CONTINENTAL TRAVEL
801-484-9800

PAGE 1 OF 4
85553
TOTAL CABINS

1858.00CC
2258.00
400.00CC
2332491.00
SLC
0.00
2458.00CHECK 16AUG95
F
2585.00
SLC
1858.00CC
1858.00
J
6332491.'X
SLC
1958.00CC
2693.00
400.00CC
C
?-352358.00
PDX
1858.00CK CO 2258.00
400.00CC
J
2332491.00
SLC
2258.00CK CO 2258.00
C
4352693.00
SLC
1858.00CC
1858.00
J
6332491.00
SLC
1858.00CC
2258.00
400.00CC
J
2332491.00
SLC
1858.00CC
1858.00
J
6332491.00
SLC
2058.00CK CO 2058.00
C
2693.00
635SLC
1858.00CK CO 2258.00
J
400.00CC
2491.00
233SLC
1858.00CC
1858.00
J
2491.00
633SLC
2058.00CKAR 2458.00 RCVD 8-18
C
400.00CC
2693.00
SLC
26.BIRCH.TERESSA
22931858.00CC
2258.00
400.00CC
27.DANIELS.ROBERT
J
2491.00
SLC
28.DAN1ELS.ELIZABETH
2332058.00CK CO 2058.00
29.FINCH.J ALAN
C
2693.00
SLC
30.FINCH.DIANE
635TOUR CONDUCTOR SLC
NSMK
ai TM I M i \-w\
c
SLC
3£.IGOM,DgTSY

1.MEASOM.ROBERT
2.MEASOM.STACEY
3.HANSEN.CINDY
4.HANSEN.DAN
5.FAUSETT,DANIE^
6.FAUSETT.CONNIE
7.ALEXANDER.ALLYCE
8.ALEXANDER.CLIF
9.SMITH.BILL
10.SMITH, JANICE
11.CURTIS.DALE
12.CURTIS.ANDREA
13.KIRK.RODNEY
14.KIRK.KERRY
15.DANIELS.MICHAEL
16.DANIELS.KAREN
17.HENRIE.RICHARD
18.HENRIE, JANET
19.BAILEY.REED
20.BAILEY.MICHELLE
21.BARBER.BOYD
22.BARBER.SHARLENE
23.BAXTER.KEN
24.BAXTER.LESLIE
25.BIRCH.RICHARD

X

GROUP PASSENGER LIST
SEAWARD 26 NOV 95

J

^/f^/^^^7^

3^//U

PAGE 2 OF 4
33.SPAINHOWER.PHILLIP
34.SPAINH0WER.ANITA
35.HEAP.RON
36.HEAP.ELNA
37.JASPER.RANDY
38.JASPER.BETHENE
39.JOHNSON.LLOYD
40.JOHNSON.LINDA
41 .WOODARD, ROBERTA
42.MILLYARD.TERRY
43.SMITH.LORRAINE
44.SMITH.BRENT
45.BROWN.GAIL
46.NAY.MARTIN
47.NAY.COLLETTE
48.OWENS.JEFF
49.0WENS.CAROLYN
50.PIERCE.CRAIG,
51.PIERCE.NANCY
52.SMITH.R0BERT
53.SMITH.BECKY
54.LOFTIN.LYNN MR
55.LOFTIN.LESLIE MRS
56.BILLS.STEVE
57.BILLS.GERALYN
58.CHRISTENSEN.DARRYL
59.CHRISTENSEN.SHARLA
60.EDWARDS.JASON
61 .EDWARDS, KIM MRS
62.TALLON.THOMAS
63.TALLON.RUTHANN

2258.00
2258.00CC
2491.00
233SLC
2258.00
1858.00CC
J 400.00CC
2491.00
233SLC
2458.00
2058.00CC
C 400.00CC
2693.00
235SLC
2458.00
2058.00CC
C 400.00CC
2693.00
235SLC
B 1000.00CK 17AUG AR 1758.00CK CO 2758.00
2899.00
1141SLC
2987.00
2108.00CC
D 879.00CC
5703557.00
TRPL
SLC
TRPL
SLC
2058.00CKAF[ 400.00
C 400.00CC
2693.00
2293SLC
2858.00
C 400.00CC
2058.00CC
165+
SLC 400.00CC CHRISTEN 2693.00
1858.00
J
1858.00CC
2491.00
633SLC
1858.00
J
1858.00CC
2491.00
633SLC
0.00
J
1858.00CK
24912491.00
SLC.
0 258.00
22332491.00
J
1858.00CKCO 1858.00
6332491.00
SLC
J
1858.00CKCO 1858.00
633SLC
2491.00
C
2058.00CK CO 2058.00
6352693.00
SLC
J

TOUR CONDUCTOR
64.SHUPE.DOUG
A
65.SHUPE.DIANE

tismz

1129.00CC
SLC

1129.00
2927.00

1798-

66.BENS0N.LAWRENCE
67.BENSON.SUSAN
68.C1_ARK.ALAN S
69.NIELSON.MARILYN
70.REYNOLDS.ROBERT
71.REYN0LDS.RAELYN
72.CROCKET.ERIKA
73.JENKINS.CAROL
74.NELSON.DARLENE
75.BAILEY.LOIS
76.STRATTON.KAREN
77.WEBSTER.ANN J
78.PETERSON.NEAL
79.PETERSON.CLAUDIA
80.PAUL.JOHNNY
81.PAUL.LENA
82.JOHNSTON.CLYDE RUSSELL
83.JOHNSTON.DIANE
V 84.PARKER.CARLA
A 85.PARKER.DALE
86.KELLER.ELENA
87.KELLER.DAN
88.BEAGLEY.CODY
89.BEAGLEY.JILL
90.BEAGLEY.BRETT
91.BEAGLEY.D0NNA
92.BEAGLEY.DAVID
93.BEAGLEY.BONNIE
94.WILSON.JOHN
95.WILSON.ROSLYN

TOUR CONDUCTOR
96.VAN ORDEN.SCOTT
97.VAN ORDEN.BECKI

PAGE 3 OF 4
2058.00CK CO 2058.00
2693.00
SLC
J
1996.00CK CO 1996.00
2491.00
SLC
J
1996.00CK CO 1996.00
2491.00
SLC
C 1029.00CC; 1053.00CK CO 2082.00
2693 DO
SLC
2058.00
C
2058.00CC
2693.00
SLC
2458.00
C 1229.00CC 1229.00CC
2693.00
SLC
2458.00
C 2458.00CC
2693.00
SLC
2930.00
B 2930.00CASH CO
2930.00
SLC
A 2398.00CKARRCV8-19 2398.00
2927.00
SLC
A 400.00CC
2398.00CKAR8-18
2927.00
SLC
2458.00
F 400.00CC 2058.00CC
2585.00
SLC
1858.00
J 1858.00CCDSHUPE
2491.00
SLC
1858.00
J 1858.00CCDSHUPE
2491.00
SLC
1858.00
J 1858.00CC
2491.00
SLC
2345.00
G 2405.00DISCOVER
SLC
BDAY27NOV95 2765.00
C

J 1858.00CC

SLC

1858.00
2491.00

635495495611635235235ZERO
29272527127633633633420-

633-

98.CODY.KIM MR
99.CODY.CONNIE

G

2205.00DISCOVER
SLC

PAGE 4 OF 4
2260.00
2765.00

505-
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laephone: (801)484-9800

C .

Itiecopier: ( 80^ 484-9821

September 2*7. 1995
TO: L. LEE FIET

^ 31

FROM: LEW W. I SON
RE:

Concerns O V P r contract.

Dear Sir,
We recently concluded an agreement for the sale of the
business i terest and assets oi Aristocrat Travel of Bountiful.
In return for various peri rmances on your part, I was to remit
sums of monies in payment for the conveyance by you of said
business interest and assets. As- you know, this sale has been
discussed by us for some time, and one of the big reasons why it
has taken so long to consummate in any form at all is that my
attempts to reach an agreement with you that included back-out
clauses and clauses allowing me to see the books of your company
and familiarize myself with your operations were thwarted by you
at every turn. In short, you consistently refused to give me any
advance information, financial or otherwise, concerning the
general viability of your agency( s) . I now see why thi is.
To date, you have not performed, or have
agreement in a number of ways:

misled me in this

( 1) Approximately 80% of the office equipment and supplies
you listed on Schedule "A" either does not exist or cannot
be located;
( 2) You previously signed over at least one of your
exterior signs to American Towers, whereas the agreement
acknowledges the existence of the signs and my right to
them, and your conveyance of the rights to them, to me;
( 3) You have falsified various bookings, making it appear
on the surface that there was more business than there
really was;
( 4) You have apparently personally taken possession and
disposed of approximately $13,000.00 in deposits made by 126
'ITER TO L.

LEE FIET RE:

CONCERNS

OVER CONTRACT

PftGE 1

people who you booked on an NCL cruise departing on November
26, 1995; that cruise is now in jeopardy, and I have been
forced to tie up my own funds to guarantee their passage.
There are other things also.
I want you to know, and put
you on formal notice that I do not intend to perform on any more
payments on the contract that we entered into as I consider that
you are guilty of negligent misrepresentation, trespass upon the
chattels of your customers, the conversion of those chattels,
theft by deception, and fraud; furthermore, as to your conversion
of other peoples' assets, you have further left me holding the
bag as it were, to try to make your theft of their monies right,
if I could, thus threatening me with a loss of goodwill with
these customers as well as my own. As such, I have no doubt that
any court of competent jurisdiction will consider this contract
null and void ab initio, and will award me damages for the
trouble I have gone to over this whole matter.
Finally, I warn you that unless this matter is resolved to
my satisfaction, I intend not only to pursue any and all civil
remedies
at my disposal, but to refer your name to the
appropriate county attorney( s)
for investigation prior
to
returning an indictment against you for violations of the theft
by deception statutes and RICO violations.
I urge you to make this right with me with all due haste.

Lew w. I son, President,
Continental Travel L. C.
LETTER TO L. LEE FIET RE: CONCERNS OVER CONTRACT

PAGE 2

Addendum 0

CONTINENTAL TRAVEL
28 Emt 2100 Jkwth »112.S«ltL»k»CJt)r, Utah B41U
(t(H)U44ftO0 FAX(M1}«e4-M21

11 OCTOBER 1995
DEAR CRUISE MEMBER,
WELCOME ABOARD. YOU ARE SCHEDULED TO EMBARK ON THE MS SEAWARD
FROM THE PORT OF SAN JUAN, NOVEMBER 26,1dt5, FOR A SEVEN DAY CRUISE,
SAILING TO THE EXCITING PORTS OF ARUBA, CURACAO.TORTOLA, AND ST THOMAS.
IN CONFIRMING YOUR CRUISE WITH NORWEGIAN CRUISE UNES TODAY, I WAS
INFORMED THA- THE ITINERARY IS ANTICIPATED TO BE AS OUTLINED, THERe WILL
BE FERRY SERVICE FROM TORTOLA TO VIRGIN GORDA AND FROM ST THOMAS TO ST
JOHN . GIVEN THIS YEAR'S WEATHER I WILL LET YOU KNOW IF ANY CHANGES OCCUR
BETWEEN NOW AND YOUR SAILING DATE.
AS YOU ARE AWARE, ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL IS OUT OF BUSINESS. ALL
CONTRACTS. QUOTES, AND COMMITMENTS OF ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL ARE NULL AND
VOID. SOME OF THE MONIES THAT WERE PAID TC^ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL WERE NOT
FgjWARDED_TQNQRWFGtAN CRUI8E I tNES. SOMj^OFTHE PRICES QUOTEOTO YOU
J3YARJSIOCRAT TRAVEL WERE NOT ASSU_RATE1___
NORWEGIAN CRUISE UNES WILL NOT RELEASE ANY CRUISE DOCUMENTS TO
CONTINENTAL TRAVEL UNTIL A U . FUNOS OUE NORWEGIAN CRUISE UNES HAVEBEEN
RECIEVED BY NORWEGIAN CRUI8E UNES. CURRENTLY A DEFICIT OF SA30^

IS

DUE 20 OCTOBER. 1*05, IN OROER TO COMPLETE PAYMENT OF THE CRUISE AND
SECURE DOCUMENTS FOR YOUR CABIN. CANCELLATION PENALTIES DO APPLY,
CURRENTLY 4M.00 PER CABIN, SHOULD YOU CHOOSE TO NOT TRAVEL AS
SCHEDULEO. REFUNDS WOULD BE AMOUNT THAT YOU HAVE PAID LESS ANY
DEFICITS AND PENALTIES.
I AM WORKING WITH NCL TO 8EE IF ANY DISCOUNTS CAN BE FOUND TO BE
APPUED TO THIS GROUP. BETSY AND I DO PLAN TO BE WITH YOU ABOARD SHIP TO
HELP YOU IN ANY WAY WE CAN TO MAKE THIS AN ENJOYABLE CRUISE FOR YOU. WE
ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING YOU. WE WILL LET YOU KNOW WHEN THE
DOCUMENTS ARRIVE.
THANK YOU,

LEWISON

Addendum P

SENT BY:

1 0 - 2 4 - 9 5 ;10:14AM ;

SC4M LAK FIUVH LTAH ATTY GEN/FBEU;* S

C O N T I N E N T A L
T R A V E L
L . C.
28 East 2100 South, Suite 112
Salt Lake City UT 84115
Telephone: ( 801)484-9800

Telecopier: ( SOI) 484-4891

October 17, 199 5

TO:

All persons who have booked cruise spacp with Aristocrat
Travel of Bountiful on N C L for the following date:
November 26/ 19 94

FROM: LEW W. ISON, President
RE:

Continental Travel L. C.

Important notice.

You will please take notice,
following important information:

you and each

of you,

of the

1)
on 21 AUG 1995 Continental Travel entered into an
agreement with L. Lee Fiet of Aristocrat Travel of
Bountiful
to purchase
the business
interest of
Aristocrat, which consisted primarily of a client list,
some bookings, and a few pieces of furniture.
2)
Pursuant to this agreement/
continental was to
assume no liability for any outstanding obligations
owed
oy
Aristocrat,
including
remittances
to
Fiet/Aristocrat by travelers on the cruises leaving on
the above-referenced dates.
3)
Continental has not at any tim« purchased any
shares of stock in Aristocrat,
and has never had an
ownership interest in said Company of any kind.
4)
It has become apparent to us that Fiet/Aristocrat
has not remitted the funds paid by some of tho
travelers on the cruises aforementioned, to NCL.
As it
stands right now, there is a significant shortage whicn
needs to be made up. If this shortage Is not made up,
NCL will cancel the cruise for the entire group and no
one will go, regardless of whether they have paid the
full fare or not.
5)
has

continental considers also that
Fiet/Aristocrat
defaulted on the provisions of the Agreement

..^**
uwc
A^teenien'c # oetween
itself
and
Fiet/ Aristocrat for non-pertormance as well as other
tortious acts which are the subject of an upcoming
legal action aqainst said company/individual,
6)
Having rescinded the Agreement wiin Aristocrat,
Continental Will not assume liability for Aristocrat' s
actions in failing to remit the monies for said cruis*,
and cannot assist the group in resolving the problem;
Continental, in so saying, points out the following:
(a; The problem is susceptible of resolution,
were continental to be authorized by the various
groups to step in and resolve the Situation;
(b) Continental cannot at this tiias render any
assistance
with
this
problem,
other
than
identifying the essence
of the problem
and
conveying this informa-cion as timely as possible
to
the
various
meinbers
of
the
groups
aforementioned, due to the possibility of a false
presumption being created that Continental has
liability for the acts of Aristocrat, which it
does not;
( c) With regard to the resolution of the problem,
were
continental to be formally engaged and
commissioned by the various groups aforementioned,
to solve this problem, these groups would have to
accede to Continental' s explicit direction, with
no exceptions, to solve the problem.
Again: Continental wants to make clear that, pursuant to the
foregoing information it assumes no liability for the actions of
Fiet/Aristocrat in not remitting said funds to NCL; and further,
it does not consider it reasonable or legally viable for those so
discomfited by Aristocrat to look to Continental to make good on
behalf of Aristocrat something that is entirely \riStocrat' s
problem and liability. Continental considers that all those who
have allegedly received legal advica to the contrary . and who
argue that Continental should make good another Aristocrat's
liabilities, whether incurred by that company through simple
negligence or purposeful defalcation, should carefully consider
the wisdom of such a course.
While Continental is concerned
about the situation from a standpoint of wanting to help, it ha*
no intention of assuming any liability of any other company in
this, or any other matter; however, if the groups want to enter
into a separate agreement with Continental to * take over" the
situation, and are willing to be bound by Continental' s handling
of the problem, the situation can likely be resolved.
LETTER RE: NCL CRUISES CONTRACTED KITH ARISTOCRAT

PAGE 2

ISon# President,
Continental Travel L. c.
LWl/kob
C # C. :

LETTS* RE; NCL CRUISES CONTRACTED WITH ARISTOCRAT
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Addendum R

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of Lew Ison
dba Continental Ti ivel L.L.C.

: FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
: OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER

Appearances:
Mark E. Kleinfield for the Division of Consumer Pi

*on

Lew Ison for Respondent
By the Administrative Law Judge:
Pursuant to a November 16, 1995 notice, a November 20, 1995 hearing was
conducted in the above-entitled proceeding before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law
Judge for the Department of Commerce. Thereafter, evidence was presented and argument
offered as to an October 30, 1995 citation issued to Respondent by the Division.
The Administrative Law Judge entered a Recommended Order at the conclusion of the
hearing, the terms of which are restated as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Aristocrat Travel Services, Inc. (hereinafter, Aristocrat) is a corporation

registered to do business in this state. Lee Fiet was the president of that entity from 1981 to
1995. Mr. Fiet was not regularly involved in Aristocrat's daily operations subsequent to
January 1995. Respondent Lew Ison is the president of Continental Travel (hereinafter,
Continental), a limited liability company doing business in this state.
2.

Pursuant to an August 21, 1995 purchase agreement, Continental agreed to buy

certain assets of Aristocrat for $60,000, which included cruise and tour bookings with
scheduled departures after August 21, 1995. The agreement provided for an initial payment
$10,000 to Aristocrat. The balance was to be paid from both a percentage of
commissions on cruise groups booked through Aristocrat which were scheduled to sail

from November 1995 through January 1996 and a percentage of Aristocrat's net profits from
office locations.
3.

The August 21, 1995 purchase agreement provides that Aristocrat "covenants that

all deposits for cruise and tour bookings have been paid over to the cruise line or tour
operator" and that any deposits "not having been paid over shall be delivered" to
Continental. The agreement further provides that, on confirmation by Continental that "all
cruise and tour deposits have been paid to the cruise lines, tour operators or received" by
Continental, the latter (Continental) "assumes all responsibility for the cruise and tour
booking transferred" to that company.
4.

Aristocrat-through Mr. Fiet—had reserved sixty-six cabins on a November 26,

1995 cruise booking with Norwegian Cruise Lines. A $25 deposit per person for double
occupancy on each cabin was due from Aristocrat to hold each cabin. That payment was to
be made between 30-60 days from Aristocrat's contract with Norwegian Cruise Lines. An
additional $175 per person was due 120 days prior to the sailing date. The final payment
was due 60 days prior to the sailing date.
5.

Payments by cash or check could be made by passengers to Aristocrat and those

monies were to then be paid by Aristocrat to Norwegian Cruise Lines. Alternatively,
passengers could make credit card payments directly to Norwegian Cruise Lines. This
record does not reflect the total passengers booked by Aristocrat for the November 26, 1995
cruise, the total funds received by Aristocrat from those passengers or an individualized
accounting of funds received by Aristocrat from any given passenger. Prior to August 21,
1995, Aristocrat had remitted a total of $12,597 to Norwegian Cruise Lines for the
November 26, 1995 cruise. Aristocrat issued the final billing statement to passengers for
that cruise on or about August 15, 1995. Such funds were to be paid to either Aristocrat or
Norwegian Cruise Lines no later than September 26, 1995.
6.

Prior to August 21, 1995, Mr. Fiet became aware that insufficient funds had been

paid to Norwegian Cruise Lines to hold the cabins which Aristocrat had initially reserved for
the November 26, 1995 cruise. There is no sufficient evidence to enter any finding as to the
amount of that deficit or the difference between the monies paid to Aristocrat from those
passengers scheduled to depart on the November 26, 1995 cruise and the funds remitted by
2
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Aristocrat to Norwegian Cruise Lines in that regard. Based on the credible evidence
presented, it appears funds in e ess of $10,000 were diverted prior to Au
were not properly credited to c
7

Respondent review

lin passengers booked on the November
:>ome of Aristocrat's business records, b

t 21, 1995 and
1995 cruise.
prior and

subsequent to August 21, 1995. Respondent contacted Mr. Fiet in late September 1995 after
Continental ha< become av -e of the above-dec ;bed def it. Based on the more credible
evidence prese

\ Continental had not been pr

ied all /f Aristocrat's business records as

to readily document those funds which Aristocrat had received from the passengers in
question. Mr. Fiet was not certain as to whatever funds were received by Aristocrat and
then paid u Norwegian Cruise Lines as of Augus' 21, 1995. Moreover, it appears the
passenger list for the November 26, 1995 cruise was not complete.
8.

The August 21, 1995 purchase agreement between Aristocrat and Continental

does not provide either when or the manner by which Continental was to provide
confirmation to Aristocrat regarding the status of cruise and tour deposits as to then transfer
responsibility for those bookings to Continental. Based on the substantial and credible
evidence presented and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, Continental did not
provide any confirmation to Aristocrat as to assume responsibility for the cruise and tour
bookings in question.
9.

On or about August 21, 1995, Continental had paid 57,000 of the initial $10,000

due to Aristocrat. Continental issued a $3,000 check to Aristocrat on September 1, 1995.
However, Continental subsequently stopped payment on that check and notified Aristocrat of
an intent to rescind the August 21, 1995 purchase agreement. This record does not reflect
the exact date or dates that Continental stopped payment on the $3,000 check and notified
Aristocrat of any intent to rescind the purchase agreement.
10. On or about October 11, 1995, Respondent provided written notice to those
passengers of record for the November 26, 1995 cruise that Aristocrat "is out of business"
and that "contracts, quotes, and commitments" of Aristocrat are "null and void".
Respondent further represented that some monies paid to Aristocrat "were not forwarded to
Norwegian Cruise Lines" and that some of the prices quoted by Aristocrat "were not
accurate". Respondent thus informed those passengers as to the amount of the deficit
3

payment due by October 20, 1995 to "complete payment of the cruise and secure documents
for your cabin". Respondent also provided notice that cancellation penalties of $450 per
cabin would apply.
11. Commencing mid-October 1995, the Division received eight (8) complaints from
various passengers initially scheduled to depart on the November 26, 1995 cruise. This
record does not reflect whether-and in whatever manner—those complaints may have been
subsequently resolved. However, Continental provided written notice to Norwegian Cruise
Lines on or about October 25, 1995 that sixteen passengers were to be released from the
group booking on the November 26, 1995 cruise. Norwegian Cruise Lines charged
cancellation fees for various passengers and Continental paid a total of $6,800 to Norwegian
Cruise Lines in cancellation fees for seventeen passengers.
12. The Division also received complaints from Francis and Donna Hansen
(hereinafter, the Hansens) and Dennis and Milly Daniels (hereinafter, the Daniels) regarding
their status for the January 14, 1996 cruise. The Hansens had paid a total of $649 to
Aristocrat between April 28, 1995 and May 19, 1995. This record does not reflect the total
monies which the Daniels had paid to Aristocrat. However, those funds were paid sometime
in April or May 1995. Based on the credible evidence presented, neither the Hansens nor
the Daniels were on the passenger list maintained by Norwegian Cruise Lines for the January
14, 1996 cruise. Further, Norwegian Cruise Lines had no record of any funds received from
Aristocrat which represented payments made to Aristocrat by the Hansens and the Daniels.
13. Based on the reasonable inferences from the credible evidence presented, the
Hansens and the Daniels requested a full refund from Continental on or about October 9,
1995. Both the Hansens and the Daniels also informed Continental that they had taken action
to stop payment on the credit card draft which they had issued-payable to Norwegian Cruise
Lines-for the balance on the cruise which was due September 29, 1995. Respondent advised
the Hansens and the Daniels to directly contact Norwegian Cruise Lines and also referred
then to Mr. Fiet or his attorney. The Hansens and the Daniels have not received any refund
of the monies which they paid to Aristocrat.
14. The Division did not review Aristocrat's bank records, the source of any payment
made by Aristocrat to Norwegian Cruise Lines or the method of payment by any passenger
4

in question. Any records maintained by Norwegian Cruise Lines were not available for
Division review. This record does not reflect -hatevei payments were made by passengers
after Aucjst 21, 1995 as to either the November 26, 1995 or January 14, 1996 cruises. This
record does also not reflect whether payments were received from those passengers after
August 21, 1995 by both Respondent and Norwegian Cruise Lines. This record reflects no
substantial evidence as to whatever funds~if any-Respondent received subsequent to August
21, 1995. There is no evidence Respondent received any funds from either the Hansens or
the Daniels as to the January 14, 1996 cruise.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division contends Respondent received payments from passengers who were
booked on either the November 26, 1995 or January 14, 1996 cruises, yet failed to furnish
the cruises in question. The Division also asserts Respondent represented that a sixty day
cancellation policy existed, yet Respondent refused to refund monies paid by passengers who
had timely requested a refund. The Division thus argues Respondent violated the Consumer
Sales Practices Act in both of those instances as to each of the ten complainants. The
Division seeks entry of a $1,000 fine for each violation, which thus totals $20,000. The
Division also seeks entry of a cease and desist order.
U.C.A. §13-11-4(2) provides:
. . . a supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if the supplier
knowingly or intentionally:
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not
involve a warranty, a disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty
terms, or other rights, remedies, or obligations, if the representation
is false;
(1) after receipt of payment for goods or services, fails to ship
the goods or furnish the services within the time advertised or
otherwise represented . . . unless within the applicable time period
the supplier provides the buyer with the option to either cancel the
sales agreement and receive a refund of all previous payments to the
supplier . . . .
§13-11-3(6) defines supplier as:

5

. . . a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, broker, or other person who
regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer
transactions, whether or not he deals directly with the consumer.
There is a lack of substantial evidence to find and conclude Respondent violated either of the
above-quoted statutes. Specifically, Respondent made no misrepresentation to any passenger
or ever disputed whether a refund was available from Aristocrat or Norwegian Cruise Lines.
Rather, the crux of the issue is whether any refund of monies paid to Aristocrat was to be
made by Aristocrat or Continental.
Significantly, Respondent never provided confirmation to Aristocrat that a full and
accurate accounting of tour and cruise deposits existed as to then be held responsible for
those bookings. Moreover, it is undisputed that payments from the Hansens and the Daniels
were made to Aristocrat, yet never properly deposited with Norwegian Cruise Lines on
behalf of those passengers. Absent confirmation by Respondent to Aristocrat, as required in
the August 21, 1995 purchase agreement, the Court concludes Aristocrat had the initial and
continuing responsibility to provide any refund as to monies previously paid by any
passenger to Aristocrat.
Further, there is no substantial evidence Respondent received payment from any
passenger for either cruise and then failed to furnish the contractual services to be provided
for any such passenger. The Court reiterates that payments from the Hansens and the
Daniels were made to Aristocrat. The Court also notes the various methods of payment,
whereby passengers could either pay Aristocrat or-presumably-Respondent by cash or check
or make payment to Norwegian Cruise Lines directly by credit card. This record contains no
substantial evidence to find Respondent received monies from any passenger after August 21,
1995.
Unfortunately, payments made to Aristocrat by various passengers prior to August 21,
1995 were diverted and not properly credited to those passengers. This record does not
establish by whom or the manner in which those funds were diverted.

Respondent took

some remedial action after Continental became aware that payments made by certain
passengers to Aristocrat had not been properly credited. However, there is simply no
substantial evidence Respondent received payments from any passengers and subsequently

6

refused to furnish those passengers with services relating to their bookings on either of the
two cruises under review.
The Division acknowledges that Aristocrat bears some responsibility for what occurred.
Nevertheless, the Division urges Respondent was legally obligated to perform pursuant to the
August 21, 1995 agreement and Respondent thus became responsible for the two cruises in
question. The Division also contends Respondent should have discovered the monetary
shortfall at an earlier stage of his review of Aristocrat's business records and Respondent's
delay in so doing prejudiced certain consumers who were then unable to obtain refunds.
Notwithstanding the Division's attempt to assist the consumers in question by directing its
efforts toward the only financially solvent entity which might rectify this situation, no proper
factual or legal basis exists to find and conclude Respondent violated either of the abovequoted statutory provisions or the relief sought by the Division may be properly entered in
this proceeding.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the October 30, 1995 citation be dismissed,
inasmuch as no factual and legal basis exists to enter any sanction against Respondent in this
proceeding.

I hereby certify that on the ££>
day of January, 1996, the foregoing Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order were submitted to Francine A. Giani,
Director, Division of Consumer Protection for her review and action.

J/ Jteven Eklhtnd
linistrative Law Judge
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